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The Failures and the Future of Private
Foundation Governance
Zoey F. Orol*
When the private foundation governance restrictions of the 1969
Tax Reform Act were enacted, dire predictions abounded. One commentator referred to the Act as tantamount to Congress’s having
“thrown out the charitable baby with the dirty bathwater,” “encouraging the abandonment” of private foundations, “interfering with their effective operation, attacking their involvement in major social problems
and prohibiting what are in essence equitable transactions.”1 Another
forecasted that “[a]ll of the odds seem stacked against” the growth of
new foundations, “given the range of disincentives built into the law.”2
A third feared that the restrictions would increase the “death rate
among small private foundations[,]” generating “a detrimental effect on
the pluralism of our social order.”3
Measured solely by IRS data on the number and holdings of existing private foundations, these predictions appear not to have been
borne out. According to the IRS, in 2016, over 100,000 private foundations were on record as filing annual reports, with nearly $890 billion in
collective assets,4 suggesting that private foundations are thriving. A
* Copyright © 2021 by Zoey F. Orol, Associate, Personal Representation Department, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP. I would like to thank Alan S.
Halperin, Jonathan Yehuda, and Elliot Orol for their invaluable guidance and review of
multiple outlines and drafts; my interviewees, who generously shared their insights; the
Personal Representation Department at Paul, Weiss for its support of my research and
writing; the staff of the library at Paul, Weiss, Alexis Kaufman, and Brian Erickson for
their excellent research assistance; and Professors Daniel Hulsebosch and Frank Upham
at New York University School of Law for their wise counsel and editorial
recommendations.
1 Nathaniel L. Goldstein & Donald L. Sharpe, Private Charitable Foundations After
Tax Reform, 56 A.B.A. J., May 1970, at 447, 452.
2 Homer C. Wadsworth, Private Foundations and the Tax Reform Act of 1969, 39 L.
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 255, 262 (1975).
3 WILLIAM H. SMITH & CAROLYN P. CHIECHI, PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS: BEFORE
AND AFTER THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969 82 (1974).
4 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TABLE 1. DOMESTIC PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS: NUMBER AND SELECTED FINANCIAL DATA, BY TYPE OF FOUNDATION AND SIZE OF FAIR
MARKET VALUE OF TOTAL ASSETS, TAX YEAR 2016, https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soitax-stats-domestic-private-foundation-and-charitable-trust-statistics#2 [https://perma.cc/
493S-CADX]. By contrast, the Treasury Department’s landmark 1965 study of private
foundations noted the existence of only 14,865 organizations that would qualify as private
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closer look at the 1969 Tax Reform Act’s foundation governance-related
provisions and their legacy, however, reveals a more complicated story.
This article argues that the large number of existing private foundations
and the significant value of their holdings mask a deep-seated and growing frustration with the restrictions imposed by the Act that threatens to
dethrone the private foundation from its historical primacy in the field
of private philanthropy. Ironically, then, the grim forecasts from the
Act’s early days may well, 50 years later, be coming true.
Judging by the remarkable achievements of private foundations
since the first such organizations were founded in the Gilded Age, this
primacy is merited. The Rockefeller Foundation made highly effective
grants in 1915 to fight the yellow fever epidemic;5 the Carnegie Corporation provided critical early support to public libraries throughout the
country in the late 19th and early 20th centuries;6 the Sarah Scaife Foundation made a substantial grant to support the laboratory that ultimately
developed a cure for polio;7 and the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation
supported the development of the 911-dial emergency response system.8
More recently, foundations have joined the efforts to fight the COVID19 pandemic;9 the Libra Foundation, funded by a branch of the Pritzker
family, distributed $350,000 in rapid-response grants over the course of
only three weeks to organizations helping families separated at the border between the United States and Mexico;10 and 15 Michigan-based
foundations under the definition that was adopted in the 1969 Tax Reform Act, with total
assets of $16.26 billion, or just under $135 billion in 2020 dollars (adjusted for inflation).
S. COMM. ON FIN., 89TH CONG., REP. ON PRIVATE FOUNDATION 74 tbl.7, 79 tbl.10, 83
tbl.11 (Comm. Print 1965) [hereinafter TREASURY REPORT]; U.S. INFLATION CALCULATOR, https://www.usinflationcalculator.com/ [https://perma.cc/39XV-SNVS].
5 Peter Frumkin, The Long Recoil from Regulation: Private Philanthropic Foundations and the Tax Reform Act of 1969, 28 AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 266, 266 (1998); Erling
Norrby, Yellow Fever and Max Theiler: The Only Nobel Prize for a Virus Vaccine, J.
EXPERIMENTAL MED., Nov. 26, 2007, at 2779, 2799, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/
articles/PMC2118520/pdf/jem2042779.pdf.
6 Frumkin, supra note 5, at 266; Debra Viadero, Carnegie Corp. Repeats History
with New Library Grants, EDUC. WEEK (June 16, 1999), https://www.edweek.org/policypolitics/carnegie-corp-repeats-history-with-new-library-grants/1999/06 [https://perma.cc/
R2UU-2VAF].
7 Frumkin, supra note 5, at 266-67; Caitrin Keiper, Conquering Polio, THE PHILANTHROPY ROUNDTABLE (Summer 2012), https://www.philanthropyroundtable.org/philanthropy-magazine/article/conquering-polio [https://perma.cc/X72G-PXVY].
8 Paul Sullivan, Notre-Dame Donation Backlash Raises Debate: What’s Worthy of
Philanthropy?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/26/yourmoney/notre-dame-donation-backlash-philanthropy.html [https://perma.cc/XH8T-Z93T].
9 See, e.g., Mark Suzman, Announcing the COVID-19 Therapeutics Accelerator,
BILL & MELINDA GATES FOUND. (Mar. 9, 2020), https://www.gatesfoundation.org/TheOptimist/Articles/coronavirus-mark-suzman-therapeutics [https://perma.cc/5NDF-V4F4].
10 See Philip Rojc, Inside the Libra Foundation: How a Branch of the Pritzker Family Backs Movement Building, INSIDE PHILANTHROPY (Oct. 22, 2018), https://
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and national foundations joined forces to rescue the lauded art collection of the Detroit Institute of Arts.11 And it is no accident that these
achievements have all been fostered by private foundations. As the
Treasury Department noted in its landmark 1965 study of private foundations, these organizations are particularly nimble: they “can be
uniquely qualified to initiate thought and action, experiment with new
and untried ventures, dissent from prevailing attitudes, and act quickly
and flexibly . . . . [B]ecause their funds are frequently free of commitment to specific operating programs, they can shift the focus of their
interest and their financial support from one charitable area to another.”12 The Treasury Department concluded that private foundations
“constitute a powerful instrument for evolution, growth, and improvement in the shape and direction of charity.”13 Private foundations, as
these successful programs and the Treasury Department’s assessment
demonstrate, are particularly well-suited to meeting specific societal
needs that would otherwise go unaddressed.
The Act, however, has jeopardized the possibility of private foundations’ continuing this pattern of landmark achievements. The unnecessary complexity of the Act has proven to be a minefield for even the
most seasoned nonprofit experts. The bright-line nature of particular
rules and foundations’ inability to engage in dialogue with regulators —
owing partly to chronic underfunding of the IRS’s enforcement arm —
have caught too many innocent acts in the excise tax net. And the formover-substance aspect of certain requirements, coupled with the rise of
alternative philanthropic vehicles that are able to avoid these requirements, has engendered a lack of public confidence in the regulatory
regime.
The cumulative effect of these issues has been to precipitate the
decline of private foundations in favor of substantially — and, arguably,
troublingly — less restrictive alternatives, which are largely structured
in ways that make it less likely that they will achieve the type of broadranging social benefit that private foundations have historically fostered.
Donor-advised funds, or DAFs, for example, which are among the most
popular recipients of charitable contributions, are structured such that it
is virtually impossible for a visionary donor to use the vehicle to establish and administer ongoing socially-beneficial programs. Furthermore,
www.insidephilanthropy.com/home/2018/10/22/inside-the-libra-foundation-how-abranch-of-the-pritzker-family-backs-movement-building [https://perma.cc/WGL5-LVS5].
11 Liz Essley Whyte, Philanthropy Keeps the Lights on in Detroit, THE PHILANTHROPY ROUNDTABLE (Winter 2014), https://www.philanthropyroundtable.org/philanthropy-magazine/article/philanthropy-keeps-the-lights-on-in-detroit [https://perma.cc/
YD2T-LFSS].
12 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 4, at 5.
13 Id.
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DAFs are not required to make any annual distributions for charitable
purposes, and nearly 22% make no annual distributions at all,14 which
means that donors receive an immediate income tax deduction for donations without any assurance to the public of corresponding social benefit. Section 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations, another type of
alternative philanthropic vehicle that has become quite popular in recent years, are appealing to donors in significant part because they act as
a shelter from capital gains tax, because the use of their assets need not
be restricted to traditional charitable purposes, and because, relatedly,
their activities may inure in part to their donors’ benefit. These attributes, collectively, make it highly unlikely that 501(c)(4) organizations
would foster the benefits of foundations past because donors often use
them for reasons that have little to do with a passion for particular philanthropic endeavors. Given these alternatives — which lack the structural features that make foundations uniquely suited to address
changing and urgent philanthropic needs — and the manifest social
good that foundations have achieved, the decline of private foundations
is undesirable and should be averted.
This article proceeds in four parts. Part I reviews the history of
foundation governance prior to the 1969 Tax Reform Act, including the
concerns that motivated Congress to enact the Act’s restrictions. Part II
provides an overview of the rules that were enacted. Part III evaluates
the legacy of these rules over the past 50 years, arguing that, while wellintentioned, the rules have not achieved their aims and, in fact, have
served to drive interest away from establishing private foundations. Part
IV proposes solutions to revitalize interest in creating and funding private foundations, including directing more resources to the IRS’s audit
function by earmarking the “audit fee” proceeds as intended; jettisoning
bright-line rules in the self-dealing and, to a lesser extent, excess business holdings contexts in favor of fact-specific determinations; incentivizing good grant-making through open dialogue between regulators
and foundations; and removing unnecessary barriers to making grants to
foreign charities.
Research is based not only on traditional sources, such as legislative
history and scholarly articles, but also on interviews with leading practitioners in the field of nonprofit law, administration, and governance;
14 Lewis B. Cullman & Ray Madoff, The Undermining of American Charity, N.Y.
REV. BOOKS (July 14, 2016), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2016/07/14/the-undermining-of-american-charity/ [https://perma.cc/NE7C-HS2W]; Ray Madoff, Three Simple
Steps to Protect Charities and American Taxpayers from the Rise of Donor-Advised
Funds, NONPROFIT Q. (July 25, 2018), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/three-simple-stepsto-protect-charities-and-american-taxpayers-from-the-rise-of-donor-advised-funds/
[https://perma.cc/6C9W-LKA3].
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academics who specialize in these fields; and current and former government officials affiliated with the IRS and the Treasury Department.
These interviewees’ anecdotes and insights are vital to painting a complete picture of the landscape of private foundations today — one
starkly at odds with what the IRS’s raw data would otherwise suggest.
I. HISTORICAL CONTEXT: PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY
STATES

IN THE

UNITED

The history of private philanthropy in the United States is one of
conflicting impulses. On the one hand, since the country’s founding,
Americans have shown dedication to supporting charitable causes, and
the government, at both the federal and state levels, has sought to encourage a culture of individual giving by rewarding charitable donors
with tax incentives. On the other hand, the current deep-seated unease
with the prominence in American social and political life of private philanthropic organizations15 stretches back to the country’s inception as
well. These parallel undercurrents have, over time, traded places of
prominence in a way that has shaped the regulation of private foundations, and played a significant role in the drafting and enactment of the
Tax Reform Act of 1969.
A. Early Days
America’s culture of private philanthropy is as old as the country
itself. When Alexis de Tocqueville visited the country in 1831, he expressed awe at the widespread commitment to charitable causes that he
observed among the population.16 Perhaps the single best-known private philanthropist of early America was Benjamin Franklin, who aimed
to create socially-beneficial programs through private organizations. He
created a group called the Junto, which brought together private citizens
to engage in various civic endeavors; established an organization of volunteer firefighters in Philadelphia; personally formulated plans to improve the physical state of Philadelphia’s streets and to police
neighborhoods; and was among the founders of the University of Pennsylvania.17 While perhaps atypical in the extent of his philanthropic endeavors, Franklin was hardly unique among early Americans in his
dedication to charitable causes.18
To immunize private philanthropy from government interference,
however, the Supreme Court’s involvement was required. In the 1819
15
16
17
18

See infra text accompanying notes 201-03.
SMITH & CHIECHI, supra note 3, at 5.
Id.
Id.
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Dartmouth College case, the Supreme Court applied the Contracts
Clause of the U.S. Constitution to invalidate the New Hampshire legislature’s attempt to establish state control over Dartmouth’s governance
and operations.19 The case is notable for being one of the earliest American examples of a court sanctioning a private corporation established
for charitable purposes.20 Twenty-five years later, in the 1844 case of
Vidal v. Girard’s Executors, the Supreme Court removed an American
holdover from English common law and confirmed that a private citizen’s charitable contributions — in that case, a testamentary bequest to
establish a school for orphans21 — would be enforced, even if made to
associations that were not incorporated under state law.22 As a result of
Girard, federal law was largely settled by the mid-19th century: private
philanthropic dispositions would be respected and insulated from government interference.
And yet, as evidence of the early tension between support and suspicion of private philanthropy, while the Supreme Court was in the process of clearing the way, some states installed roadblocks to private
philanthropic dispositions. In the years after independence, seven states
— Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Virginia, West Virginia
and Wisconsin — invalidated charitable trusts out of inherited distrust
of both the Anglican Church and perpetual restraints on alienation of
property.23 In 1829, between Dartmouth College and Girard, New
York’s legislature enacted a statute based on England’s Mortmain law
that “severely restrict[ed] devises to charity and codified a trust law regime without the inclusion of a charitable trust, thus severely restricting
the likelihood a charitable gift would be upheld.”24 While these restrictions gradually fell away over the ensuing decades, some state legislatures remained hesitant: New York’s statute, for instance, was not
expressly overturned until the Tilden Act of 1893.25
B. The Gilded Age, its Backlash, and Congress’s Response
The first organizations that resembled modern private foundations
were established in the Gilded Age. Wealthy industrialists, following in
19

Trs. Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 518 (1819).
Id. at 646-50.
21 Vidal v. Girard’s Executors, 43 U.S. 127, 129 (1844). This testamentary bequest
was especially controversial because Girard’s will specified that clergymen would be prohibited from teaching at the school. Id. at 133.
22 Id. at 198-201.
23 William H. Byrnes, IV, The Private Foundation’s Topsy Turvy Road in the American Political Process, 4 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 496, 503-04 (2004).
24 Id. at 504.
25 See James J. Fishman, The Development of Nonprofit Corporation Law and an
Agenda for Reform, 34 EMORY L.J. 617, 628-29 (1985).
20
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the American tradition of private philanthropy, sought to create mechanisms to formalize their charitable giving. Andrew Carnegie’s 1889 article “Wealth” functioned as a quasi-manifesto for these industrialists,
arguing:
This, then is held to be the duty of the man of Wealth: First, to
set an example of modest, unostentatious living, shunning display or extravagance; to provide moderately for the legitimate
wants of those dependent upon him; and after doing so to consider all surplus revenues which come to him simply as trust
funds, which he is called upon to administer, and strictly bound
as a matter of duty to administer in the manner which, in his
judgment, is best calculated to produce the most beneficial results for the community — the man of wealth thus becoming
the mere agent and trustee for his poorer brethren, bringing to
their service his superior wisdom, experience, and ability to administer, doing for them better than they would or could do for
themselves.26
Carnegie’s philosophy, shared by other magnates — among them John
D. Rockefeller and Margaret Olivia Slocum Sage — precipitated the
founding of the first private foundation-type organizations, many of
which still exist today and have formulated lauded social programs.27 By
1910, wealthy industrialists had created more than 60 such entities.28
Notably, their rationales for doing so had nothing to do with individual
tax benefits: there was no charitable income tax deduction available at
the time.29 These early foundations set the precedent for establishing
organizations aimed at fostering significant and targeted social benefit.
The Rockefeller Foundation, for instance, began making grants in 1915
to fight the yellow fever epidemic, and the Carnegie Corporation made
grants to support public libraries across the country.30
26 Andrew Carnegie, Wealth, 148 N. AM. REV. 653, 661-62 (1889), reprinted in THE
GOSPEL OF WEALTH 12 (2017), https://media.carnegie.org/filer_public/0a/e1/0ae166c5fca3-4adf-82a7-74c0534cd8de/gospel_of_wealth_2017.pdf.
27 See infra text accompanying notes 70-72.
28 Nina J. Crimm, A Case Study of a Private Foundation’s Governance and SelfInterested Fiduciaries Calls for Further Regulation, 50 EMORY L.J. 1093, 1103-04 (2001).
29 See SMITH & CHIECHI, supra note 3, at 11-12 (illustrating that there was no charitable income tax deduction in 1910). In fact, there was no income tax at all until the
Sixteenth Amendment took effect in 1913. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. The income tax
charitable deduction was enacted four years later. War Revenue Act of 1917, Pub. L. No.
65-50, § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 300, 330. The assets of the foundations were, however, exempt
from tax. Id.; see also 1 COMM’N ON INDUS. RELS., FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION
ON INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, at 81, reprinted from S. Doc. No. 64-415 (1916) [hereinafter
Walsh Commission Report Vol. 1].
30 Frumkin, supra note 5, at 266.
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The backlash was not far behind. The 1916 report of the Walsh
Commission, known formally as the Commission on Industrial Relations, which Congress established in 1912, represented the first instance
of members of Congress conveying skepticism about private foundations in an organized fashion. The report expressed concern about economic benefits inuring to the donors who created these organizations,
these organizations’ assets not being subject to tax, and a small subset of
wealthy individuals exerting undue control over American life.31 Despite the Commission’s having heard some pro-foundation testimony —
including, unsurprisingly, from John D. Rockefeller, who testified that
funds dedicated for private philanthropic purposes “should be left as
large as possible to continue to make the substantial contributions to the
wealth of the community in which they operated”32 — the report concluded that wealthy industrialists were coming to control “the education
and ‘social service’ of the Nation . . . largely through the creation of
enormous privately managed funds for indefinite purposes, hereinafter
designated ‘foundations,’” that “are exempt from taxation, yet during
the lives of the founders are subject to their dictation for any purpose
other than commercial profit.”33 The Commission found that these
foundations’ assets “represent largely the results either of the exploitation of American workers through the payment of low wages or of the
exploitation of the American public through the exaction of high
prices.”34
The Walsh Commission’s recommendations were aimed primarily
at ensuring a layer of government oversight of private foundations — a
harbinger of Congressional action later in the century. Among other
suggestions, the Commission recommended that each foundation with
assets exceeding $1 million and having more than one function be required to obtain a federal charter, which should specify the foundation’s
powers and activities; mandate that funds not be accumulated in the
foundation; permit “[r]igid inspection of the finances” of the foundation;
and require that the foundation make reports about its operations to the
31

Walsh Commission Report Vol. 1, supra note 29, at 80-83.
8 COMM’N ON INDUS. RELS., 64TH CONG., INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: FINAL REPORT AND TESTIMONY, at 7858 (1916).
33 Walsh Commission Report Vol. 1, supra note 29, at 81.
34 Id. at 82. Interestingly, some private foundation opponents objected on more
philosophical grounds. Henry Ford, for instance, argued that philanthropy and charity
prevented people from “help[ing] themselves.” 8 COMM’N ON INDUS. RELS. at 7630. This
opposition is ironic given the Ford Foundation’s significant endowment in the immediate
pre-Act period and the degree to which its grant-making constituted a catalyst for the
1969 Tax Reform Act. See TREASURY REPORT, supra note 4, at 80 (discussing the assets
of the Ford Foundation relative to all foundations); see also infra text accompanying
notes 87-91 (illustrating examples of grants made by the Ford Foundation).
32
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government that would be publicly available.35 The Commission recommended that Congress study foundations further,36 a recommendation
that Congress would belatedly take up several decades later.37
Despite the forceful opposition to foundations evidenced in the
Commission’s report, Congress’s immediate response reflected a diametrically opposed view of foundations.38 In 1917, Congress passed laws
granting individuals an income tax deduction for their charitable contributions, which was limited to 15% of the donor’s adjusted gross income,39 and Congress continued to adopt what one scholar calls a
“laissez-faire attitude” toward private foundations in the following decades.40 It was not until the 1940s, when the number of private foundations began to increase substantially and their assets grew noticeably,
that Congress and the public showed renewed interest. Public reports of
families gifting nonvoting stock in corporations to foundations and retaining control of these businesses while receiving tax deductions, for
instance, engendered widespread criticism.41 And even when Congress
finally legislated in 1950, the results were hardly what the Walsh Commission’s members would have desired.42
C. The 1950 Legislation
Congress legislated in 1950 to address some of the concerns that the
Walsh Commission had raised and that others had taken up in subsequent decades. The resulting legislation, however, had practical effects
that were less significant than foundation critics hoped, and Congress
ultimately followed the legislation with the establishment of a number
of committees to further study private foundations and make new regulatory recommendations.
As Congress considered the provisions that would ultimately comprise the 1950 legislation, Treasury Secretary John Wesley Snyder explained the Truman Administration’s concerns about private
35

Walsh Commission Report Vol. 1, supra note 29, at 85.
Id.
37 See infra text accompanying note 69.
38 See Walsh Commission Report Vol. 1, supra note 29, at 82-85; see also War Revenue Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-50, § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 300, 330. The legislative history of
the War Revenue Act does not contain an explanation for this disparity.
39 War Revenue Act § 1201(2).
40 SMITH & CHIECHI, supra note 3, at 16.
41 CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER, FEDERAL TAX POLICY AND CHARITABLE GIVING 26061 (1985).
42 It is notable, however, that despite the negative attention private foundations attracted, this was a period of fertile, socially-beneficial activity for private foundations. In
1948, for instance, the Sarah Scaife Foundation made a grant that supported the laboratory that ultimately developed a cure for polio. See Frumkin, supra note 5, at 266-67.
36
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foundations to the Ways and Means Committee. Echoing the concerns
of the Walsh Commission, he argued:
Another . . . abuse of tax exemption involves the establishment
of so-called charitable foundations or trusts which serve as a
cloak for controlling businesses. The present law permits the
transfer of business investments to tax-exempt trusts and foundations for these purposes without payment of estate or gift
taxes. The income subsequently received from the business . . .
is exempt from income tax. The abuse to which this type of
device lends itself is the retention and reinvestment of a major
share of the trust income in a manner which will benefit the
grantor.43
Snyder then proposed a minimum payout requirement for private foundations, as well as “a prohibition against dealings between the trust [or
foundation] and its creator or businesses under his control and against
the use of the trust [or foundation] for the personal advantage of the
grantor.”44 Interestingly, while not taken up in the 1950 legislation,
these proposals would find echoes in the 1969 Tax Reform Act.
The Ways and Means Committee of the House of Representatives,
too, proposed legislation at that time that bore more resemblance to the
1969 Act’s provisions than to those that were ultimately enacted in 1950.
Among other proposals, Ways and Means advocated a blanket prohibition on foundations entering into financial transactions with certain related people or entities, a tax on foundation investment income that was
not distributed for charitable purposes, and a denial of the donor’s charitable deduction if he contributed a family-controlled business to his
foundation.45 The Committee’s explanation largely echoed Snyder’s
concerns:
Frequently families owning or controlling large businesses set
up private trusts or foundations to keep control of the business
in the family after death . . . . To prevent the avoidance of income, estate, and gift tax liability in such cases, your committee’s bill provides that no charitable deduction be allowed to a
contributor for income, estate, and gift tax purposes if [the
contributor and family members control the recipient organization and also control the corporation the stock of which is contributed] . . . . Your committee believes that denial of
43 Revenue Revisions of 1950: Hearing on H.R. 8920 Before the Comm. on Fin., 81st
Cong. 19 (1950) (statement of Hon. John W. Snyder, Secretary of the Treasury).
44 Id.
45 Thomas A. Troyer, The 1969 Private Foundation Law: Historical Perspective on
Its Origins and Underpinnings, 27 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 52, 53 (2000).
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deductions in such cases is simply a recognition of the fact that
where such control exists no completed gift for which a deduction should be granted has been made.46
While the House of Representatives approved the bill as drafted, the
Senate Finance Committee made substantial alterations.47 The blanket
prohibition on related-party transactions was deleted; such transactions
would be permissible if made at arm’s length.48 The proposed tax on
undistributed foundation income and the denial of a charitable deduction for contributions of family businesses were removed.49 Ultimately,
the Conference Committee tasked with reconciling the two bills adopted
the Senate’s provisions, but included in the legislation denials of exemption when a foundation accumulated, rather than distributed, income in
unreasonable amounts or for an unreasonably long period, and when
income was either not used for exempt purposes or invested in a manner
that would jeopardize the foundation’s charitable purposes.50 As one
commentator put it, “the restrictions on private foundations that
emerged from the 1950 legislative process were, then, quite modest.”51
D. Anticipating the 1969 Tax Reform Act
The 1950 legislation did little to quell public and Congressional concern about private foundations. Well-publicized news reports continued
to showcase the tax and business-control benefits of foundations that
had provoked criticism over the previous decades. A Business Week article from May 7, 1960, which the Treasury Department would ultimately cite in its landmark 1965 study of private foundations, explicitly
recommended using a foundation to pass a family business to heirs without generating estate tax and without relinquishing control over the business. The article noted:
The real motive behind most private foundations is keeping
control of wealth (even while the wealth itself is given away).
Take the typical case. Say the bulk of your property is in a
family business. When you die, if you have a high-bracket estate, the estate tax could cause a forced sale of part or even all
of the business — your children might lose control of the company, as well as have to sell their shares at a poor price. A
foundation can prevent this. You set it up, dedicated to charity.
46 COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS H.R., REVENUE ACT
2319, at 43-44 (1950).
47 See Troyer, supra note 45, at 53.
48 Id.
49 See id.
50 Id. at 53-54.
51 Id. at 54.

OF

1950, H.R. REP. NO. 81-
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Year by year, you make gifts of company stock to it, until the
value of your remaining holdings is down to the point where
eventual estate taxes could be paid without undue strain, or
until the foundation’s holdings constitute firm control of the
company. You maintain control of the foundation while you
live; you direct its charitable activities — and so, indirectly, you
control the shares in your company that have been donated.
When you die, control of the foundation passes from you to
your family or other persons you trust and thus they, in turn,
keep reins on the business.52
The article continued, advocating the “purely personal ‘advantages’” of
a private foundation: “You and your family members can deal privately
with your foundation provided the transactions can be considered to improve its income or asset position.”53 These were precisely the concerns
that, theoretically, Congress’s 1950 legislation sought to address. Apparently, the legislation had not had its intended effect.
Four subsequent legislative developments lay the groundwork for
the 1969 legislation. First, the House of Representatives established the
Select Committee to Investigate Tax-Exempt Foundations and Comparable Organizations in 1952. The Select Committee, known as the Cox
Commission (after its chairman, Edward Cox, a Democratic member of
the House of Representatives from Georgia), had an anti-Communist
agenda: it was tasked with determining which foundations “are using
their resources for purposes other than the purposes for which they
were established and especially to determine which . . . are using their
resources for un-American and subversive activities or for purposes not
in the interest or tradition of the United States . . . .”54 Unfortunately
for the suspicious Congressmen who issued its mandate, the Cox Commission’s report concluded that foundations played a largely beneficial
role in American society, identifying foundations as leaders in expanding the “frontiers of knowledge”;55 contributing to advancements
in medicine and public health and “elevating medical education in this
country to a position of world eminence”;56 “raising the level of education in our colleges and universities”;57 and making “equally significant”
contributions to “natural sciences,” “international relations, public administration and government, the humanities, race relations, the arts,
52
53
54
55
56
57

Personal Business, BUS. WEEK, May 7, 1960, at 153, 153.
Id. at 153-54.
H.R. REP. NO. 82-2514, at 2 (1953).
Id. at 3.
Id. at 4.
Id.
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adult education, recreation, and economics.”58 In fact, of the two significant recommendations that the Cox Commission made, one of them was
for Congress to legislate in a manner that would encourage the growth
of private foundations, given what the Commission viewed as their salutary influence on American society.59 The stark difference between the
Cox Commission’s recommendations, on the one hand, and those of the
next Congressional committee to be commissioned on the topic and
Congressman Wright Patman’s influential reports on private foundations from the 1960s, discussed below, on the other, are an apt illustration of the dueling undercurrents of support and suspicion of private
philanthropic endeavors that date back to the country’s founding.
Unsurprisingly, Congress was unsatisfied with the Cox Commission’s report, and commissioned the Reece Committee (so known because its chair was B. Carroll Reece, Republican member of the House
of Representatives from Tennessee) in 1954, which ultimately did allege
that certain foundations had Communist sympathies.60 The Reece Committee expressed broader concern with the operations of private foundations. It found that foundations’ managers showed “little
implementation of . . . responsibility to the general welfare,” and that
“the foundations administer their capital and income with the widest
freedom, bordering at times on irresponsibility.”61 The report contended that foundations exerted undue influence on the field of social
sciences; that they had the potential to “exercise various forms of patronage which carry with them elements of thought control,” including
by influencing educational institutions; that they had a disconcerting
ability to influence national policy; and that they had infiltrated the media such that criticism of foundations was no longer possible,62 an ironic
comment given the history of public and Congressional criticism of
foundations’ operations. The Committee recommended enacting a legislative definition of private foundations, granting public access to foundations’ annual reports, allowing foundations more time to distribute
their income to ensure that grants were made properly and with charitable aims in mind, requiring foundations’ boards to have a government58

Id.
Id. at 13. The other recommendation was for foundations to publicly account for
their assets and activities. Id.
60 See generally H.R. REP. NO. 83-2681, pt. 2, at 54 (1954) (discussing several foundations’ connections to Communism as shown by the Cox Committee and stating, “It is
too much to assume that Communist success was limited to the exposed incidences. Indeed, where foundations are involved in so high a concentration of power . . . we may
assume that some advantage may have been taken by the Communists . . . for malign
purposes.”).
61 Id. at 16.
62 Id. at 17-18.
59
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appointed director, prohibiting control of businesses through foundations, and increasing the number of foundation audits.63 A number of
these recommendations would be reflected in the 1969 Tax Reform Act.
In the third significant legislative development of the immediate
pre-Act period, Texas Congressman Wright Patman authored seven reports in the 1960s on the topic of private foundations.64 He believed that
wealthy Americans used foundations to take improper advantage of tax
laws, control corporations, and unduly influence public policy.65 His recommendations were far-reaching, including prohibiting the establishment of new private foundations, requiring private foundations to
terminate 25 years after their establishment, establishing a national regulator for foundations, having the Treasury Department enforce the
self-dealing rules more vigorously, implementing restrictions on foundations’ commercial activities (including lending and borrowing money),
limiting foundations to owning no more than 3% of the shares of any
corporation, limiting foundations’ ability to vote shares of a corporation,
precluding donors from taking charitable deductions until contributions
were actually spent, requiring all contributions to be spent as they were
received, imposing a 20% income tax on foundations, and prohibiting
foundations from engaging in certain voter registration activities.66 Marcus Owens, formerly the director of the Exempt Organizations Division
of the Internal Revenue Service and currently Partner at Loeb & Loeb
LLP in Washington, D.C. in the area of nonprofit law, notes that “Patman, being a conservative Texas Democrat, had little use for highly-paid

63

Id. at 213-17.
These reports were: (1) WRIGHT PATMAN, STAFF OF H. COMM. SMALL BUS., 87TH
CONG., TAX-EXEMPT FOUNDATIONS AND CHARITABLE TRUSTS: THEIR IMPACT ON OUR
ECONOMY (Comm. Print 1962); (2) WRIGHT PATMAN, STAFF OF H. COMM. SMALL BUS.,
INSTALLMENT NO. 2, 88TH CONG., TAX-EXEMPT FOUNDATIONS AND CHARITABLE
TRUSTS: THEIR IMPACT ON OUR ECONOMY (Comm. Print 1963); (3) WRIGHT PATMAN,
STAFF OF H. COMM. SMALL BUS., INSTALLMENT NO. 3, 88TH CONG., TAX-EXEMPT FOUNDATIONS AND CHARITABLE TRUSTS: THEIR IMPACT ON OUR ECONOMY (Comm. Print
1964); (4) WRIGHT PATMAN, STAFF OF H. COMM. SMALL BUS., INSTALLMENT NO. 4, 89TH
CONG., TAX-EXEMPT FOUNDATIONS AND CHARITABLE TRUSTS: THEIR IMPACT ON OUR
ECONOMY (Comm. Print 1966); (5) WRIGHT PATMAN, STAFF OF H. COMM. SMALL BUS.,
INSTALLMENT NO. 5, 90TH CONG., TAX-EXEMPT FOUNDATIONS AND CHARITABLE
TRUSTS: THEIR IMPACT ON OUR ECONOMY (Comm. Print 1967); (6) WRIGHT PATMAN,
STAFF OF H. COMM. SMALL BUS., INSTALLMENT NO. 6, 90TH CONG., TAX-EXEMPT FOUNDATIONS AND CHARITABLE TRUSTS: THEIR IMPACT ON OUR ECONOMY (Comm. Print
1968); and (7) WRIGHT PATMAN, STAFF OF H. COMM. SMALL BUS., INSTALLMENT NO. 7,
91ST CONG., TAX-EXEMPT FOUNDATIONS AND CHARITABLE TRUSTS: THEIR IMPACT ON
OUR ECONOMY (Comm. Print 1969).
65 Byrnes, supra note 23, at 563.
66 Id.
64
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charities officials from New York City who wore fancy suits, like the
Ford Foundation people. There was no small amount of animosity.”67
Patman’s reports were influential. In fact, Harvey Dale, University
Professor of Philanthropy and the Law at NYU School of Law and the
Director of the National Center on Philanthropy and the Law, contends
that the “Patman hearings were probably the most important” motivation for the 1969 Tax Reform Act because they “led to the 1965 Treasury studies,”68 a reference to the fourth major legislative development
of the immediate pre-Act period: the Treasury Department’s report on
private foundations, commissioned in 1964 and issued on February 2,
1965.
The Treasury Department report was the Congressional fact-finding mission that had the most significant impact on what would ultimately become the 1969 Act. The Treasury Department evaluated
foundation administration and governance using a sample size of 1,300
foundations.69 The report both acknowledged the socially-beneficial effects of foundation-led programs and grant-making and recommended
significant alterations to the law.
On the positive side, the Treasury Department found that “most
private foundations act responsibly and contribute significantly to the
improvement of our society.”70 Further, the Treasury Department emphasized the “special and vital role in our society” of private philanthropy, including in “areas into which government cannot or should not
advance (such as religion),” as well as foundations’ “unique[ ]” ability
“to initiate thought and action, experiment with new and untried ventures, dissent from prevailing attitudes, and act quickly and flexibly.”71
Because “even . . . those of relatively restricted means” could establish
private foundations, private foundations served to “enrich the pluralism
of our social order.”72
While acknowledging the social benefits of foundations, the Treasury Department did find that “[s]erious abuses do exist among a minority of private foundations, and they require correction and restraint.”73
The report highlighted six areas in which Congressional action was warranted: self-dealing, delay in benefit to charity, foundations’ involvement in business, families’ use of foundations to control corporate
67 Telephone Interview with Marcus S. Owens, Partner, Loeb & Loeb LLP (June 3,
2019) [hereinafter Owens Interview].
68 Telephone Interview with Harvey Dale, U. Prof. Philanthropy & L., N.Y. Univ.,
Dir., Nat’l Ctr. on Philanthropy & L. (June 3, 2019) [hereinafter Dale Interview].
69 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 4, at 77.
70 Id. at 13.
71 Id. at 5.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 14.
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interests and other property, foundations’ engaging in financial transactions unrelated to their charitable functions, and families’ continued
control of foundations’ management over time.74
With respect to self-dealing, the Treasury Department report noted
that transactions with a foundation’s founder or donor “are rarely necessary to the discharge of the foundation’s charitable objectives; and
they give rise to very real danger of diversion of foundation assets to
private advantage.”75 The 1950 legislation had imposed facts-and-circumstances and reasonableness tests to determine whether particular
acts of self-dealing should be prohibited; these standards, the Treasury
Department report contended, were imprecise and hard to administer.
The report recommended, instead, a blanket prohibition on self-dealing
transactions76 — a recommendation that the 1969 Act would
incorporate.77
Similarly, the Treasury Department noted that the “indefiniteness”
of the law denying an exemption in the case of unreasonable accumulations of income and use of income in a way that jeopardized charitable
purposes (or at least in a way that was not in promotion of charitable
purposes) led to insufficient enforcement.78 The report recommended
that private foundations “be required to devote all of their net income
to active charitable operations . . . on a reasonably current basis,” with
“a five-year carryforward provision and a rule permitting accumulation
for a specified reasonable period if their purpose is clearly designated in
advance and accumulation by the foundation is necessary to that purpose.”79 This recommendation, too, would be taken up in the 1969
Act.80
Echoing one of the most common criticisms of private foundations
since the 1916 Walsh Commission report was published, the Treasury
Department expressed significant concern about foundations’ involvement in business and families’ use of foundations to control these business interests. The report noted the “competitive disadvantage” of nonfoundation-controlled businesses, due to the tax-favored treatment of
foundations’ assets; the potential for self-dealing inherent in foundations’ ownership of businesses; and the concern that foundations’ managers would be overly consumed with management of foundation74

Id. at 15-57.
Id. at 6.
76 Id.
77 Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 4941(a)(1), 83 Stat. 487, 499; General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, H.R. 13270, 91st Cong., Pub. L. No. 91172, 30-36 (1970).
78 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 4, at 7.
79 Id.
80 Tax Reform Act of 1969 § 4943(c)(6); H.R. 13270, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 56-57.
75
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owned businesses.81 The report recommended imposing “an absolute
limit upon the participation of private foundations in active business”
and suggested that a foundation should not be permitted to own 20% or
more of a “business unrelated to the charitable activities of the foundation.”82 And when a donor to a foundation and related parties did maintain control of a business, the report recommended denying income tax
deductions for transfers to the foundation until “(a) the foundation disposes of the contributed asset[s], (b) the foundation devotes the property to active charitable operations, or (c) donor control over the
business or property terminates.”83 As described below, the 1969 Act
accepted these recommendations in large part.84
The Treasury Department’s final two recommendations were not
implemented in the 1969 Act. First, the report recommended that “all
borrowing by private foundations for investment purposes be prohibited,” among other investment restrictions.85 While certain investment
restrictions — namely, the jeopardizing investment rules of what would
become Internal Revenue Code section 4944 — were implemented, the
Treasury Department’s more draconian proposals were not. Similarly,
the report recommended that after a certain period of time, the “donor
and related parties would not be permitted to constitute more than 25
percent of the foundation’s governing body.”86 This recommendation
was not incorporated into the law. To this day, there is no requirement
of independent management for foundations.
A few private foundations’ highly publicized controversial acts ignited the powder keg of Congress’s skepticism following the publication
of the Treasury Department report. The Ford Foundation was a particular target. Teacher groups expressed outrage at the Ford Foundation’s
support of school decentralization in Brooklyn’s Oceanhill-Brownsville
school district.87 In Cleveland’s 1967 mayoral election, the Ford Foundation made grants to the Congress on Racial Equality to encourage African-Americans to register to vote; opponents of mayoral candidate Carl
Stokes, who was ultimately elected as Cleveland’s first African-American mayor, were up in arms about the grants.88 And after Senator Robert F. Kennedy’s assassination, the Ford Foundation distributed grants
to a number of former aides of his, provoking allegations of “political
81

TREASURY REPORT, supra note 4, at 7.
Id.
83 Id. at 8.
84 See infra Part II.D.
85 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 4, at 9.
86 Id. at 9-10.
87 See John G. Simon, The Regulation of American Foundations: Looking Backward
at the Tax Reform Act of 1969, 6 VOLUNTAS 243, 244 (1995); Troyer, supra note 45, at 60.
88 Troyer, supra note 45, at 60.
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favoritism” and personal patronage89 without “intellectual benefit.”90
Owens noted that some of these grant recipients “were reportedly photographed on yachts on the Aegean Sea.”91
There is real debate on how widespread these controversial acts
were. Owens notes that “there was anecdotal evidence” of “actual
abuses,” but “how common those were was another matter because the
IRS audit program was not particularly extensive or systematic in those
days.”92 Dale notes that “legislation can derive from a small number of
anecdotes. I’m pretty sure that that was the case in 1969, though [in that
case, it was not a] tiny number of anecdotes.”93 Regardless of how many
foundations were engaged in conduct that was perceived as controversial or problematic, the public’s and Congress’s attention had been
tuned to the issue. John Sare, Partner in the Tax-Exempt Organizations
practice and the Trusts and Estates group of Patterson Belknap Webb &
Tyler LLP in New York, notes that “there were enough perceived
abuses in the world of family foundations that they were the subject of
two popular novels of the day”: Kurt Vonnegut’s God Bless You, Mr.
Rosewater, which eventually became an Off-Broadway musical, and
How Firm a Foundation by Patrick Dennis. Sare adds:
There was a widespread sense in the popular culture that foundations were places where a rich patron could provide a job for
people who weren’t capable of doing anything else and could
indulge in activities of dubious philanthropic value. This may
or may not have been true, of course, but the perception was
still there.94
Ultimately, this public perception mattered more than how widespread
these abuses actually were (which, as Owens points out, may have been
impossible to discern), and the stage was set for the 1969 Tax Reform
Act.
II. THE TAX REFORM ACT

OF

1969

The Treasury Department report laid the groundwork for the provisions that were ultimately enacted as part of the Tax Reform Act of
1969. In fact, parts of the Act’s legislative history mirror, almost verbatim, passages from the Treasury Department’s report. The provisions
89 John R. Labovitz, The Impact of the Private Foundation Provisions of the Tax
Reform Act of 1969: Early Empirical Measurements, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 63, 67 (1974).
90 SMITH & CHIECHI, supra note 3, at 44.
91 Owens Interview, supra note 67.
92 Id.
93 Dale Interview, supra note 68.
94 Telephone Interview with John Sare, Partner, Patterson Belknap Webb & Tyler
LLP (June 11, 2019) [hereinafter Sare Interview].
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that were ultimately enacted constitute the most significant, and most
stringent, regulations governing the operations of private foundations in
American history, and, over 50 years later, most still remain in effect as
passed. This Part reviews the highlights of the Act.
A. Section 4940: Net Investment Income Tax
Internal Revenue Code section 4940 imposed a 4% tax on the net
investment income of all private foundations, with the ostensible purpose of funding the IRS’s private foundation audits.95 In 1978, the 4%
tax was reduced to a 2% tax, with the possibility of a further reduction
to a 1% tax for private foundations that could demonstrate having made
a certain average percentage payout over the preceding 5 years and having used the 1% savings to make additional qualifying charitable distributions.96 In 2019, the rate was further revised to a flat 1.39%, without
the possibility of further reduction.97
Congress explicitly tied the resulting revenue to the audit function.
The House Ways and Means Committee’s explanation noted that “it is
clear that vigorous and extensive administration is needed in order to
provide appropriate assurances that private foundations will promptly
and properly use their funds for charitable purposes. This tax, then, may
be viewed as being in part a user fee.”98 The staffs of the House’s Joint
Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation and the Committee on Finance agreed: “[F]unds are needed for more and more extensive and
vigorous enforcement of the tax laws relating to foundations. A user fee
is needed to provide funds for this purpose.”99 The Senate Finance
Committee’s report concurred: “[T]he costs of [IRS] supervision should
not be borne by the general taxpayer, but rather should be imposed
upon those exempt organizations whose activities have given rise to
much of the need for supervision.”100 The new tax should be understood, the Senate Finance Committee contended, “as a supervisory fee
and as an indication of the amount of funds needed by the Internal Revenue Service for proper administration of the Internal Revenue Code
95

Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 101(b), 83 Stat. 487, 498.
Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 520(a), 92 Stat. 2763, 2884.
97 Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-94, § 206(a), 133
Stat. 2534, 3246 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 4940(a)).
98 COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS H.R., TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969, H.R. REP. NO. 91413, pt. 1, at 19 (1969) [hereinafter WAYS & MEANS COMMITTEE REPORT].
99 STAFFS J. COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAX’N & COMM. ON FINANCE, 91ST
CONG., SUMMARY OF H.R. 13270, THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969 (AS PASSED BY THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES) 11 (Comm. Print 1969) [hereinafter JOINT COMMITTEE
REPORT].
100 S. COMM. ON FIN., TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969, S. REP. NO. 91-552, at 27 [hereinafter SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE REPORT].
96
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provisions relating to private foundations and other exempt organizations.”101 Based on the legislative history, the clear intent of section
4940, then, was to raise funds that would support the IRS’s audits of
private foundations.
Despite bicameral agreement on the net investment income tax
constituting an “audit fee,” neither Congress nor the IRS subsequently
earmarked the funds for that purpose. Instead, as will be discussed, the
funds continue to flow into the general Treasury coffers. Applying these
funds for their intended purposes, this article will argue, would go a long
way toward redressing some of the problems that plague the private
foundations sector today.102
B. Section 4941: Self-Dealing Prohibitions
Internal Revenue Code section 4941103 imposed a two-tier excise
tax on all self-dealing transactions (i.e., transactions between the foundation at issue and a so-called “disqualified person,” which, generally
speaking, is defined as a substantial contributor to the foundation, a
family member of a substantial contributor, or another controlling
party).104 This provision had the effect of prohibiting any such transaction — even a transaction that would ultimately have benefited the subject foundation.
Originally, section 4941 imposed a 5% tax on the “amount involved”105 in the self-dealing transaction, payable by the disqualified
101

Id.
See infra Part IV.
103 Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 101(b), 83 Stat. 487, 498.
104 Section 4946 contains the definition of “disqualified person”: a substantial contributor to the foundation; a foundation manager; an owner of more than 20% of the
total combined voting power of a corporation, the profits interest of a partnership, or the
beneficial interest of a trust or unincorporated enterprise, which is a substantial contributor to the foundation; a member of the family of any of these individuals; a corporation of
which any of the foregoing individuals owns more than 35% of the total combined voting
power; a partnership in which any of the foregoing individuals owns more than 35% of
the profits interest; and a trust or estate in which any of the foregoing individuals holds
more than 35% of the beneficial interest. I.R.C. § 4946(a). For purposes of the self-dealing rules, government officials are also included. Id. § 4946(a)(1)(I). For purposes of the
excess business holdings rules, discussed in Part II.D, infra, a private foundation that is
effectively controlled by the same person or persons who control the private foundation
in question, or substantially all of the contributions to which were made by the same
individuals or members of their families who made substantially all of the contributions
to the private foundation in question, is also included. Id. § 4946(a)(1)(H).
105 The “amount involved” is defined as “the greater of the amount of money and
the fair market value of the other property given or the amount of money and the fair
market value of the other property received; except that, in the case of services described
in subsection (d)(2)(E), the amount involved shall be only the excess compensation.”
I.R.C. § 4941(e)(2).
102
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person who participated in an act of self-dealing, and a 2.5% tax on a
foundation manager who knew that the act was prohibited and permitted it to proceed anyway. These thresholds were increased in 2006 to
10% and 5%, respectively.106 Section 4941 imposes additional taxes if
the self-dealing is not corrected by a certain time: 200% of the amount
involved on the self-dealing party and 50% of the amount involved on a
knowingly participating foundation manager.107 The thresholds for tax
on a foundation manager were, and are, subject to certain caps.108
Congress intended these provisions as a direct response to the legacy of the 1950 legislation. The House Ways and Means Committee,
Joint Committee, and Senate Finance Committee agreed with the Treasury Department that the arm’s-length standards imposed in the 1950
law had become unworkable. Ways and Means, for instance, indicated
that these standards “require disproportionately great enforcement efforts, resulting in sporadic and uncertain effectiveness of the provision,”
and still may confer improper benefit on the foundation’s donors and
managers.109 Ways and Means cited a few examples of transactions giving rise to possibly improper benefits:
[W]here a foundation (1) purchases property from a substantial donor at a fair price, but does so in order to provide funds
to the donor who needs access to cash and cannot find a ready
customer; (2) lends money to the donor with adequate security
and at a reasonable rate of interest, but at a time when the
money market is too tight for the donor readily to find an alternative source of funds; or (3) makes commitments to lease
property from the donor at a fair rental when the donor needs
such advance leases in order to secure financing for construction or acquisition of the property.110
The Joint Committee and Senate Finance Committee reports contain
virtually identical language.111 Apparently, because Congress concluded
106 Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 1212(a)(1), 120 Stat. 780,
1074 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 4941(a)).
107 I.R.C. § 4941(b).
108 Id. § 4941(c)(2) (“With respect to any one act of self-dealing, the maximum
amount of the tax imposed by subsection (a)(2) shall not exceed $20,000, and the maximum amount of the tax imposed by subsection (b)(2) shall not exceed $20,000.”).
109 WAYS & MEANS COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 98, at 20.
110 Id. at 20-21.
111 See JOINT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 99, at 12 (“Arm’s-length standards
have proved to require disproportionately large enforcement efforts, resulting in sporadic
and uncertain effectiveness of the provisions. . . . Also, many benefits may be derived by
those who control a private foundation even though they deal completely at arm’s
length.”); SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 100, at 28-29. (“Arm’slength standards have proved to require disproportionately great enforcement efforts,
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that the enforcement mechanism would never be sufficient to police individual transactions — an irony given Congress’s parallel enactment of
an audit-fee tax in section 4940 — Congress concluded that the only way
to eliminate improper benefit was to prohibit, through section 4941, any
transactions that could conceivably give rise to it.
C. Section 4942: Required Minimum Distributions
Internal Revenue Code section 4942112 imposed a requirement that
a foundation distribute annually for charitable purposes, at minimum,
6% of the foundation’s net investment income (reduced to 5% in
1976),113 which requirement took effect following the application of certain transition rules designed to facilitate compliance in the years immediately following the Act’s passage.114 If a foundation’s distributions fall
short of this threshold, the Act imposed an additional 15% tax on the
amount of undistributed net income (increased to 30% in 2006),115 and
if not corrected in a certain period, an additional 100% tax on the undistributed amount.116
These rules were designed to respond to the Treasury Department
report’s concerns about a delay in charitable recipients benefiting from
foundations’ funds, as the 1950 law required only that accumulations of
assets not be unreasonable.117 As Ways and Means indicated, “Under
present law, if a private foundation invests in assets that produce no
current income, then it need make no distributions for charitable purposes. As a result, while the donor may receive substantial tax benefits
from his contribution currently, charity may receive absolutely no current benefit.”118 The Joint Committee and Senate Finance Committee
reports echo this rationale.119 Ultimately, these rules appear to have had
resulting in sporadic and uncertain effectiveness of the provisions. . . . [T]he committee
has concluded that even arm’s-length standards often permit use of a private foundation
to improperly benefit those who control the foundation.”).
112 Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 101(b), 83 Stat. 487, 503 (codified
as amended at I.R.C. § 4942(e)(3)).
113 Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1303(a), 90 Stat. 1520, 1715 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 4942(e)(1)).
114 See Tax Reform Act of 1969 § 101(b).
115 Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 1212(b), 120 Stat. 780,
1074 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 4942(a)).
116 Tax Reform Act of 1969 § 101(b), 83 Stat. 487, 502, 503.
117 See TREASURY REPORT, supra note 4, at 11.
118 WAYS & MEANS COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 98, at 25.
119 See JOINT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 99, at 13 (“Under present law, if a
private foundation invests in assets that produce no current income, then it need make no
distributions for charitable purposes, even though the donor has received full deductions
for the value of the nonincome-producing property he has contributed.”); SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 100, at 35 (“Under present law, if a private foun-
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a salutary effect, at least on public confidence in private foundations and
their operations, as will be discussed.120
D. Section 4943: Excess Business Holdings Prohibitions
Internal Revenue Code section 4943121 imposed a 5% excise tax on
so-called “excess business holdings,” i.e., interests in a business enterprise that exceeded certain minimum thresholds following the expiration of a permitted divestment period.122 The 5% tax was increased to
10% in 2006.123 The sum of the foundation’s holdings and the holdings
of all disqualified persons in a given business enterprise may not exceed
20% of the enterprise’s voting stock, or 35% if it can be demonstrated
that unrelated parties control the business enterprise.124 The provision
imposed a de minimis safe harbor: a foundation was permitted to own
up to 2% of the voting stock in a business enterprise.125
Echoing the Treasury Department’s report, Ways and Means, the
Joint Committee, and the Senate Finance Committee all expressed concern about the effect that business ownership had on foundation management and dedication to charitable purposes. As Ways and Means put
it,
Those who wish to use a foundation’s stock holdings to retain
business control in some cases are relatively unconcerned
about producing income to be used by the foundation for charitable purposes. Even when the foundation attains a degree of
dation invests in assets that produce no current income, then it need make no
distributions for charitable purposes. As a result, while the donor may receive substantial
tax benefits from his contribution currently, charity may receive absolutely no current
benefit.”).
120 See infra Part III.A.
121 Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 101(b), 83 Stat. 487, 507 (codified
as amended at I.R.C. § 4943(a)(1)).
122 “Excess business holdings” are defined as the excess holdings in an entity over
the so-called “permitted holdings” threshold; the “permitted holdings” threshold, in turn,
is defined as 20% of the voting stock in an incorporated business enterprise, reduced by
the percentage of the voting stock owned by all disqualified persons. If the private foundation and all disqualified persons, combined, do not own more than 35% of the voting
stock of an incorporated business enterprise, and non-disqualified persons effectively
control the enterprise, then the threshold for permitted holdings is raised to 35%. In all
events, a private foundation may hold up to 2% of the voting stock in an incorporated
business enterprise and up to 2% in value of all outstanding shares of all classes of stock.
I.R.C. § 4943(c)(2). The Code and accompanying Treasury Regulations also contain rules
for partnerships and other unincorporated entities. See I.R.C. § 4943(c)(3); Treas. Reg.
§ 53.4943-3(c).
123 Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 1212(c) 129 Stat. 780, 1074
(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 4943(a)(1)).
124 I.R.C. § 4943(c)(1), (c)(2)(A)-(B).
125 Id. § 4943(c)(2)(C).

208

ACTEC LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 46:185

independence from its major donor, there is a temptation for
the foundation’s managers to divert their interest to the maintenance and improvement of the business and away from their
charitable duties.126
Ways and Means did acknowledge that certain adjacent businesses —
such as “cafeterias and snack bars” at museums and, in a granular example, the Williamsburg Inn at Colonial Williamsburg — could be retained
under the rules.127 As will be discussed, given the trend toward professional foundation management, these rules may be antiquated, and,
some contend, have been gutted by the so-called Newman’s Own exception, enacted in 2017.128
E. Section 4944: Jeopardizing Investments
Internal Revenue Code section 4944129 imposed a 5% tax, subject
to certain caps, on amounts invested in a way that, by being excessively
risky, jeopardizes the charitable purposes of the foundation at issue.
This tax was increased to 10% in 2006.130
The Joint Committee pointed out that there was no penalty under
then-current law for imprudent or overly speculative investment.
“Under present law,” the Joint Committee Report noted, “a private
foundation manager may invest the assets (other than accumulated income) in warrants, commodity futures, and options, or may purchase on
margin or otherwise risk the entire corpus of the foundation without
being subject to any sanctions.”131 Because improperly invested funds
126

WAYS & MEANS COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 98, at 27; see also JOINT COMREPORT, supra note 99, at 15 (“The use of foundations to maintain control of
businesses appears to be increasing. Whether or not the foundation management is independent of donor control, incentive to control a business enterprise frequently detracts
from incentive to produce and use funds for charitable purposes. Temptations are frequently difficult to measure and sanctions presently are applied only in rare cases.”);
SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 100, at 38-39 (“The use of foundations
to maintain control of businesses appears to be increasing. It is unclear under present law
at what point such noncharitable purposes become sufficiently great to disqualify the
foundation from exempt status. . . . Those who wish to use a foundation’s stock holdings
to acquire or retain business control in some cases are relatively unconcerned about producing income to be used by the foundation for charitable purposes. In fact, they may
become so interested in making a success of the business, or in meeting competition, that
most of their attention and interest is devoted to this with the result that what is supposed
to be their function . . . is neglected.”).
127 WAYS & MEANS COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 98, at 43.
128 See infra text accompanying notes 219-22.
129 Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 101(b), 83 Stat. 487, 511.
130 Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 1212(d), 129 Stat. 780,
1074 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 4944(a)(1)).
131 JOINT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 99, at 16.
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would lead to diminished amounts being used for charitable purposes,
there was reason to penalize foundation managers who did not invest
wisely. As discussed below, while these rules have been some of the
least controversial components of the 1969 Act, alternatives to foundations have gained traction in part because they are not subject to these
investment requirements.
F. Section 4945: Taxable Expenditures
Internal Revenue Code section 4945132 was a direct response to the
political activities in which foundations engaged in the years leading up
to the Act.133 It imposed a 10% tax on amounts spent on political activities payable by the private foundation, plus a 2.5% tax on the participating foundation manager (increased to 20% and 5%, respectively, in
2006).134 If the offending distributions were not corrected within a certain period, the Act imposed a 100% tax on the foundation and a 50%
tax on the foundation manager, again subject to certain caps.135 It also
increased the due diligence requirements for grants to individuals and
foreign charities (known as “expenditure responsibility”),136 which ultimately had the effect of deterring foundations from making these
grants, irrespective of need.137
Without mentioning particular examples of political or legislative
activities that it found problematic, Ways and Means nonetheless addressed itself squarely to the Ford Foundation. The Committee’s explanation noted,
It . . . was called to your committee’s attention that existing law
does not effectively limit the extent to which foundations can
use their money for “educational” grants to enable people to
take vacations abroad, to have paid interludes between jobs,
and to subsidize the preparation of materials furthering specific political viewpoints.138
The Committee further derided foundations’ “financing registration
campaigns.”139 As is the case with the jeopardizing investments rules,
the section 4945 prohibitions have been among the least controversial of
132

Tax Reform Act of 1969, § 101(b) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 4945).
See supra text accompanying notes 87-91.
134 Pension Protection Act of 2006 § 1212(e)(1) (codified as amended at I.R.C.
§ 4945(a)(1)).
135 I.R.C. § 4945(b).
136 Id. § 4945(h).
137 See infra text accompanying notes 167-69.
138 WAYS & MEANS COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 98, at 33.
139 Id. at 32. The Senate Finance Committee and Joint Committee reports expressed
concern about similar issues, though with less explicit references to the Ford Foundation’s
133
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the 1969 Act’s provisions; however, the fact that foundation alternatives
are not subject to these rules has almost certainly provided a boost to
these alternatives.
III. THE LEGACY

OF THE

1969 TAX REFORM ACT

The private foundation governance provisions of the 1969 Tax Reform Act have remained largely unchanged since their passage, and they
have been the subject of relatively few litigated cases. The past halfcentury, then, represents a useful time period over which to assess the
legacy of the rules.
Unquestionably, foundations have boomed since the Act was
passed, both in terms of the number of active foundations and the fair
market value of foundation assets. As Bruce Hopkins, who practices in
the field and teaches the subject as Professor from Practice at the University of Kansas School of Law, notes, “[a] lot of people said that” the
Act marked “the end of private foundations.”140 The statistics show otherwise. At the time of the Treasury Report, approximately 15,000 private foundations existed,141 with assets of approximately $16.26
billion142 (around $134.7 billion in today’s dollars);143 as of 2016, 100,488
private foundations filed annual returns with the IRS,144 with collective
foundation assets at a fair market value of nearly $890 billion.145 While
we cannot determine how foundations would have fared absent the
Act’s passage, these statistics certainly disprove the dire predictions.
While the new rules have had certain salutary effects — interviewees largely agreed, for instance, that foundations were perceived as
“cleaning up their acts” after the Act’s passage due to increased IRS
scrutiny, required divestments resulting from the excess business holdings rules, and the minimum payout requirement — the overwhelming
consensus is that foundations have thrived in spite of, and not because
of, the Tax Reform Act. This Part will assess the legacy of the Act over
the past 50 years, highlighting both the positive and negative consequences, and will demonstrate how the Act has, ironically, jeopardized
the prospect of foundations continuing to provide the social benefit that
they have since the Gilded Age. This Part will further evaluate the rise
activities. See SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 100, at 47-48; JOINT
COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 99, at 17.
140 Telephone Interview with Bruce Hopkins, Professor of Prac., Univ. of Kan. Sch.
L. (June 13, 2019) [hereinafter Hopkins Interview].
141 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 4, at 74 tbl.7, 79 tbl.10, 83 tbl.11.
142 Id. at 74 tbl.7.
143 U.S. INFLATION CALCULATOR, supra note 4.
144 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TABLE 1, supra note 4.
145 Id.
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of alternatives to foundations that have become increasingly popular,
focusing on donor-advised funds and section 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations, which threaten to neuter the power of private philanthropy.
A. Positive Consequences of the Rules
The Act’s provisions have shaped foundation behavior in certain
positive ways. In the immediate post-Act period, the IRS stepped up its
enforcement efforts, and audits of foundations became increasingly
likely. The mere possibility of an audit, “coupled with actual audits” and
“the attendant buzz at conferences,” Owens notes, as well as the IRS’s
“pumping out a considerable number of revenue rulings in the 1970s”
on the subject of private foundations, created a perception among foundation managers that the IRS was paying close attention to their activities.146 This perception, Owens contends, “went a long way toward
encouraging voluntary tax compliance.”147
In addition to the prospect of an audit, the excess business holdings
rule also appears to have positively shaped foundations’ behavior in a
manner that, arguably, has made the rule obsolete. Because foundations
were required to divest themselves of excess business holdings immediately after the Act’s passage and diversify their portfolios, foundation
management became increasingly professionalized. As Jill Manny, Executive Director of the National Center on Philanthropy and the Law
and adjunct professor at NYU School of Law, notes, “The excess business holdings rule had a lot to do with [getting] people focused on running foundations and not running businesses.”148 No longer could
foundations simply employ family members who, theoretically, might
prioritize the financial health of a particular foundation-owned business
enterprise over charitable goals. Instead, foundations increasingly hired
professional investment and compliance teams. Manny explains that
now, “[y]ou’re not going to have a foundation manager running a business” because “they’re both big jobs.”149 Hopkins concurs, citing the
divestments required by the excess business holdings rule as positively
shaping behavior toward professionalization and, in that way, rendering
the rule “antiquated.”150
146

Owens Interview, supra note 67.
Id.
148 Telephone Interview with Jill Manny, Exec. Dir., Nat’l Ctr. on Philanthropy & L.,
Adjunct Professor, N.Y. Univ. Sch. L. (June 11, 2019) [hereinafter Manny Interview].
149 Id.
150 Hopkins Interview, supra note 140. One may argue that eliminating or making
more permissive the bright-line test of the excess business holdings rule would bring us
back to the pre-Act landscape in which foundation managers may have been unduly focused on running related operating businesses. However, given the current business landscape, it is highly unlikely that foundation managers, rather than the governing bodies of
147
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Finally, the minimum payout requirement ensured, for the first
time, that foundations would dispense funds in support of charitable
causes. Before Congress imposed the minimum payout requirement,
there was a real concern, as Martin Hall, Partner in the Private Client
group of Ropes & Gray LLP in Boston, notes, of “assets being parked, a
benefit flowing to the taxpayer-donor and no benefit being returned to
society at large through charitably funded activity.”151 But the imposition of the new requirement, Sare notes, “has provided a lot of assurance to the public and to many critics of the philanthropy sector that
foundations aren’t just stockpiling their resources.”152 The minimum
payout requirement, then, directly remedied the problem of delayed
benefit to charity that the Treasury Report and Congress focused on in
the pre-Act period.153
In these respects, then, the Act has had positive effects on the private foundation landscape. However, these particular benefits have not
been sufficient to cement public confidence in private foundations, and
certain aspects of the rules have had the paradoxical effect of limiting
the degree to which charity benefits from private foundations’
operations.
B. Negative Consequences of the Rules
Apart from these positive effects, the Act’s legacy has not been
rosy. As Ray Madoff, professor in the areas of philanthropy policy, tax,
property, and estate planning at Boston College Law School, notes,
The whole purpose of this system was to maximize the interest
in value of nonprofits, and to get resources released from donors and committed to nonprofits. It’s 50 years later. There’s
no question that the rules aren’t working. I don’t think you’d
find a single person who thinks the rules are working.154
Charles “Skip” Fox IV, Partner in the Tax & Employee Benefits department and the Private Wealth Services group of McGuireWoods LLP in
Charlottesville, Virginia, and former President of the American College
the businesses themselves, would run such businesses. Further, foundation management
has essentially become a profession unto itself; it is hard to imagine that profession simply disappearing due to a relaxation of the excess business holdings restrictions.
151 Telephone Interview with Martin Hall, Partner, Ropes & Gray LLP (June 6,
2019) [hereinafter Hall Interview]; see supra Part II.C.
152 Sare Interview, supra note 94.
153 See supra Part II.C. Ironically, the current popularity of donor-advised funds, or
DAFs, threatens to revive this very issue. See Cullman & Madoff, supra note 14; see infra
Part III.B.5.
154 Telephone Interview with Ray Madoff, Professor, Bos. Coll. L. Sch. (June 10,
2019) [hereinafter Madoff Interview].
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of Trust and Estate Counsel, concurs, reflecting, “Honestly,” there have
been “no positive consequences” of the rules.155 The complexity of the
law, the lack of dialogue between foundations and IRS regulators, and
the overinclusive nature of the bright-line rules imposed by the Act have
engendered a lack of public confidence in the regulatory regime. Cumulatively, these flaws have led philanthropists to seek ways to avoid the
restrictions entirely by creating organizations of different types, undermining Congress’s aims in promulgating the restrictions.
1. Undue Complexity
Practitioners and academics agree that the single most significant
source of the rules’ negative consequences is their undue complexity.
Most foundations fully intend to follow the rules. As Jackie Ewenstein,
Partner at Ewenstein & Roth LLP in New York specializing in nonprofit
law, notes, “The vast majority of our clients really, genuinely want to
comply with the law.”156 Hopkins agrees: “In my own practice, most of
what I see are people who are really trying to comply with the statute.”157 But the complexity of the rules is legendary. Hall described the
rules as “unfair,” adding, “While a high hurdle for eligibility for the tax
benefit seems appropriate, the setting of traps for the unwary does
not.”158 Ewenstein agrees, noting that where foundations “trip up, it’s
because the law is so complicated that” their missteps are “really inadvertent.”159 Complexity, then, is a primary problem.
Those foundations that lack the resources to hire the most sophisticated legal counsel risk running afoul of the rules despite their best intentions. Hopkins notes, “The ’69 Act created a lot of work for a lot of
lawyers. When I started to practice law in 1968, people didn’t even know
what a nonprofit lawyer was. Today, of course, it’s a major practice
area.”160 The rules are so complex, Manny notes, that “There’s really
only a handful of lawyers who understand all of these rules.”161
Because those lawyers who do have a solid grasp of the rules typically charge among the highest rates in the field, foundations have a
choice: pay the going rate or attempt to navigate the rules on their own.
Many foundations choose the former, contributing substantially to an
explosion in administrative costs. Peter Frumkin notes that, between
155 Telephone Interview with Charles “Skip” Fox IV, Partner, McGuireWoods LLP
(May 31, 2019) [hereinafter Fox Interview].
156 Telephone Interview with Jackie Ewenstein, Partner, Ewenstein & Roth LLP
(July 9, 2019) [hereinafter Ewenstein Interview].
157 Hopkins Interview, supra note 140.
158 Hall Interview, supra note 151.
159 Ewenstein Interview, supra note 156.
160 Hopkins Interview, supra note 140.
161 Manny Interview, supra note 148.
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1966 and 1972, “average administrative foundation expenses as a percentage of grant outlays increased from 6.4% to 14.9%.”162 From 1966
to 1978, “[t]he Ford Foundation’s administrative expenses as a percentage of grant outlays went from 2.3% . . . to 22.3%,” and from 5.7% to
23.6% for the Carnegie Corporation.163 And the explosion of administrative costs has continued: in 2016, the most recent year for which IRS
data is available, foundations collectively reported paying more than
$620 million in legal and accounting fees.164 As Ewenstein notes, “Navigating the complicated laws requires expert counsel and attendant legal
fees that otherwise could be redirected to charitable endeavors. There’s
a financial cost to the complicated legal regime.”165 A large portion of
these funds could otherwise have been spent for charitable purposes.
And private philanthropists who intend to establish relatively small
foundations can be deterred from doing so at all, further resulting in
reduced benefit to charity. Fox notes, “Unless you’re planning to fund a
private foundation with at least $10 million, compliance requirements
will just kill you.”166 Paradoxically, then, rules designed in large part to
maximize benefits to charity have had, in some ways, precisely the opposite effect.
For those foundations that choose the latter option, attempting to
navigate the rules on their own can result in unduly conservative grantmaking. Manny points out, “The rules cause inaction. They cause people
to make simple grants to the extent of their minimum distribution requirements to large public U.S. charities.”167 Unable to navigate the
minefield of the expenditure responsibility rules, for instance, some
foundations refuse to make grants to individuals or to any organization
that is not a public charity.168 As Frumkin writes, “caution has increasingly become an occupational necessity among foundation staffers.”169
If foundations are to step in where government retreats,170 and continue
their track record of targeted and successful programs, it is undesirable
162

Frumkin, supra note 5, at 269.
Id. at 270.
164 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TABLE 3. DOMESTIC PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS: INCOME STATEMENTS AND BALANCE SHEETS, BY SIZE OF FAIR MARKET VALUE OF TOTAL
ASSETS, TAX YEAR 2016, https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-domestic-privatefoundation-and-charitable-trust-statistics#2. [https://perma.cc/493S-CADX].
165 Ewenstein Interview, supra note 156.
166 Fox Interview, supra note 155.
167 Manny Interview, supra note 148.
168 Simon, supra note 87, at 250.
169 Frumkin, supra note 5, at 274.
170 “In other countries,” write Lewis B. Cullman and Ray Madoff,
it is common for universities, hospitals, art museums, symphonies, and social
safety nets to be funded by governments. In the U.S., charitable organizations,
supported by tax-favored private donations, carry out many of the same social
163
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to deter foundations from making grants to certain large groups of potential recipients simply because the rules are too complicated for most
foundation managers to understand or because the penalties for noncompliance are imposed regardless of intent. As a corollary, funneling
more assets to those public charities that are already among the largest
in the country — which is the “safest” course of action, as far as many
foundation managers are concerned — may be similarly undesirable;
the impact of each additional dollar on the programs that those charities
administer is likely to be substantially less significant than for newer or
less-well-funded programs.
2.

Lack of Dialogue with the IRS

The IRS could serve as a helpful resource for foundations, particularly in light of the complexity of the private foundation governance restrictions. Instead, it has become increasingly difficult to obtain any
guidance at all in this area from the IRS, due at least in part to the fact
that the IRS lacks the budget and staff to make representatives available
for dialogue with foundation managers and the general public.
The amount of IRS guidance in this field has decreased dramatically from the amount it offered in the two decades immediately following the Act’s passage. As Owens notes, in the 1970s and 1980s, “there
was a lot more guidance than there is now.”171 As Technical Advisor to
the Exempt Organizations Division in the 1980s and, later, as Director
of the Division, Owens made public the annual work plan, a memorandum describing audit projects and items of particular interest. That
memorandum alerted practitioners to the areas on which the IRS was
likely to focus for a particular period, which increased transparency and,
Owens contends, drove “the behavior of practitioners” in a positive
way.172
Not only has guidance become harder to come by, but audit activity
has also been greatly reduced.173 On the latter point, as Conrad Teitell,
Principal in the Private Clients group at Cummings & Lockwood in
Stamford, Connecticut, and adjunct law professor at the University of
Miami School of Law, points out, “All the rules in the world can’t stop
people from” engaging in abusive behavior with private foundations “if
functions. The American system depends on an adequate flow of private donations to working charities . . . .
Cullman & Madoff, supra note 14.
171 Owens Interview, supra note 67.
172 Id.
173 Telephone Interview with Conrad Teitell, Principal, Cummings & Lockwood LLC
(June 4, 2019).
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the IRS hasn’t the time and the funds to go after these people.”174
Chronic underfunding of the IRS, then, may have enabled precisely
those activities that the Act was designed to eliminate. In addition, the
audit incentives are misaligned. As Hall contends, “In most cases, there
is little incentive for the tax authorities to audit tax-exempt entities. The
potential revenue that could be generated from such activity is minimal.”175 The combination of inadequate funding and minimal incentive
has created the impression, then, that the IRS is unlikely to flag examples of foundation mismanagement. We will never know how much bad
behavior goes undetected.
The unfortunate consequences of IRS underfunding and these misaligned incentives are not limited to effectively permitting prohibited
activity. Were the IRS better funded, it could serve as a resource to
assist foundations in facilitating good grant-making that is not unduly
conservative, rather than simply enforcing rules about the grant-making
and other operations that are prohibited. As Ewenstein notes,
The real important thing is, are you doing good work with this
money because we’re giving you a tax break? But we’re not
assessing the organizations in terms of their effectiveness, and
if they’re not being any more effective than our government,
some people have asked: why aren’t we taxing them?176
But because the IRS does not even have the resources to audit suspicious activities, there is no possibility of the IRS serving as a resource to
promote beneficial ones.
3.

Overinclusive Nature of Bright-Line Rules

A number of the private foundation-related governance provisions
enacted in 1969 impose penalties for violations regardless of the circumstances of the particular case at issue.177 The self-dealing rules present a
useful case study of the drawbacks of this approach, which precludes
foundations from engaging in transactions that could be beneficial to
them — and, ultimately, to the charitable causes they serve — and that
pose no significant detriment to the public.
The benefit of the bright-line approach is, of course, its ease of administration. As Owens notes, the self-dealing rules “had the effect of
taking off the table tough valuation questions. If you argue that you’re
174

Id.
Hall Interview, supra note 151.
176 Ewenstein Interview, supra note 156.
177 See supra Parts II.B (discussing the self-dealing rules), II.C (discussing the minimum distribution requirements), II.D (discussing the excess business holdings rules), and
II.F (discussing the taxable expenditures rules).
175
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providing the office space [to a foundation to which you are a substantial contributor] at half price, how do you figure out what half price
is?”178 Instead, under current law, no substantial contributor can lease
office space for any rent to his or her foundation. Hall adds that, “from
an implementation standpoint, . . . that makes sense. It’s a smart approach, and avoids arguments over what is fair value and the like.”179
There is no question that a bright-line approach is easier for the IRS to
administer. Particularly given the IRS’s underfunding and lack of staff,
imposing a facts-and-circumstances test — at least in the current climate
— could result in significant under-enforcement of the rules.
However, commentators interviewed by the author almost uniformly pointed out that, from a policy perspective, adopting a bright-line
test in this context is problematic. Prohibiting all transactions involving
a foundation and particular parties, regardless of the substance of the
transactions, may proscribe transactions that would have been beneficial
to foundations and, correspondingly, would have directed additional
funds to charitable causes. Manny notes, “The self-dealing rules are just
totally prophylactic. They outlaw a lot of good philanthropy. Deals that
might be favorable to foundations . . . can’t be made.”180 Hopkins
agrees: “[J]ust because it’s easier to administer doesn’t mean that it’s
fair or equitable.”181 In fact, while Congress deliberated the Act’s provisions, the Joint Committee listed this very concern as one of its arguments against the proposed self-dealing rules:
This provision would prohibit fair and equitable transactions
even where they benefit charity. In addition, it seems unfair to
prevent a donor from dealing with his foundation on the same
terms that the foundation would be willing to deal with an unrelated person.182
The Joint Committee, then, foreshadowed one of the most significant
criticisms of the 1969 Act’s private governance-related provisions.
The Rockefeller Foundation’s post-Act move to new office space is
an illustrative example of the overinclusive nature of the self-dealing
rules. Before the Act’s passage, the Rockefeller Foundation leased office space in Rockefeller Center in New York City at a standard commercial rate.183 Because of the self-dealing rules, however, the
Rockefeller Foundation could no longer do so once the Act took effect,
178
179
180
181
182
183

Owens Interview, supra note 67.
Hall Interview, supra note 151.
Manny Interview, supra note 148.
Hopkins Interview, supra note 140.
JOINT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 99, at 13.
Simon, supra note 87, at 250-51.
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and moved to a different office space.184 Reports noted the high expense of this move; one report identified it at $2 million,185 or nearly $14
million in today’s dollars.186 These funds were not spent to advance
charitable causes; instead, they enriched moving companies, architects,
engineers, electricians, and furniture vendors, to name only a few. And
the Rockefeller Foundation continued to pay commercial-rate rent —
the only distinction was the identity of the landlord. It is hard to justify
this diversion of funds that, pre-Act, could have been used for charitable
purpose, particularly where the result for the foundation in expenditure
of rental payments is, in terms of value, no different from what it was in
the pre-Act period.
By contrast, in the public charities context, the IRS has adopted a
reasonableness test in assessing whether certain transactions that potentially involve self-dealing may proceed,187 suggesting that sufficient enforcement does not rely on having the easier-to-administer bright-line
rules. Sare points out one distinction that may have led Congress to apply a facts-and-circumstances test, rather than a bright-line rule, to public charities’ financial transactions: “[I]n the public charity context . . .
there are ordinarily disinterested people on the board who can regulate”
the public charity’s activities, and so a public charity may be perceived
to be less susceptible than a private foundation to engaging in transactions that benefit contributors and other insiders.188 However, simply
because private foundations may have family members on their boards
does not mean that there is necessarily a higher probability of abuse
inherent in such transactions. Furthermore, as discussed above, the increasing professionalization of foundation management in the decades
following the Act has limited the relevance of this concern.189
Notably, there are mechanisms in place to mitigate the harshness of
the self-dealing rules. Owens points out that the IRS has “the ability to
settle cases so that if something did come up” where the imposition of
the penalties would seem dramatically inequitable, the IRS could reduce
the amounts owed.190 Treasury Regulations have also carved out specific
exceptions to the self-dealing rules. The estate administration exception
to the self-dealing rules, for instance, permits an estate to engage in
transactions that would otherwise constitute prohibited indirect selfdealing (for example, where a decedent’s estate plan directs the distribu184

Id.
Id.
186 U.S. INFLATION CALCULATOR, supra note 4.
187 These transactions are referred to in the Code as “excess benefit transactions.”
See I.R.C. § 4958.
188 Sare Interview, supra note 94.
189 See supra text accompanying notes 148-50.
190 Owens Interview, supra note 67.
185
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tion of the decedent’s residuary estate to a private foundation, and the
decedent’s family wishes to purchase assets that would otherwise pass to
the foundation).191 This exception requires, among other factors, that
the probate court with jurisdiction over the estate approve the transaction and that the foundation benefit from the transaction.192 It was intended to “facilitate estate administration, permit the orderly
administration of an estate or trust, and allow flexibility to shift assets to
carry out the decedent’s intent under a will or trust otherwise allowable
under fiduciary state law principles.”193 Perhaps as an indicator that the
Treasury Department knew early on that the bright-line nature of the
self-dealing rules could prove problematic, this exception was implemented almost immediately following the Act’s passage: proposed in
1971, it was finalized in 1973.194
These mitigating measures, however, do not give most commentators comfort that the bright-line nature of the self-dealing rules is sound
policy. And from the standpoint of engendering public confidence in the
regulatory regime, it is hard to imagine that imposing a bright-line standard with substantial penalties and then allowing the de facto flexibility
to permit those who violate the general rules to settle or take advantage
of certain carve-outs would have the desired effect.
4. Continued Skepticism
Congress and the public remain skeptical of private foundations.
That skepticism is a result of both general unease about wealth inequality and specific rules in the private foundation governance regime that
have the unintended consequence of undermining public confidence
that private foundations are operating primarily for public benefit.
Legislative skepticism continues. Assuming the mantle of Senator
Wright Patman,195 Senator Charles Grassley, Republican of Iowa, has
devoted considerable efforts to increasing the excise taxes on private
foundations that violate the rules enacted in 1969.196 Those efforts pro191

See Treas. Reg. § 53.4941(d)-1(b)(1), (3).
Id. Note, however, that the IRS can still overrule the probate court’s decision to
permit a transaction to proceed. See, e.g., Rockefeller v. United States, 718 F.2d 290, 291
(8th Cir. 1983) (affirming a finding by the IRS that the plaintiff had not in fact paid fair
market value for the sold asset despite court approval).
193 RICHARD L. FOX, CHARITABLE GIVING: TAXATION, PLANNING AND STRATEGIES
¶ 30.18(5)(b) (2020).
194 Treas. Reg. § 53.4941(d)-1(b)(1), (3).
195 See supra text accompanying notes 64-68.
196 See, e.g., Press Release, Charles Grassley, Pro Tempore Emeritus, Senate,
Grassley Outlines Goals for Charitable Governance, Transparency (Mar. 10, 2009), http://
www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-outlines-goals-charitable-governance-transparency [https://perma.cc/96XA-MS3K]; Letter from Sen. Charles Grassley,
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duced what one commentator characterizes as “a substantial discussion
of the regulation of foundations during 2004-06,” including the passage
of the Pension Protection Act of 2006 that increased penalties for foundation noncompliance with certain rules,197 and further “encouraged a
significant IRS revision of Form 990 in 2009.”198 Just as Congress in the
pre-Act period sought to increase foundation accountability and encourage better behavior through legislation, so has Senator Grassley
done in more recent years.199
The public response to a private operating foundation200 that
opened in 2019, functions as a museum in New York and operates a
study center in Greenwich, Connecticut evidences broader skepticism.
An article in The New York Times following the museum’s opening in
New York noted that that foundation and several others that house privately-owned art collections constitute “private exhibition venues but
also tax havens for the very rich.”201 A Time Out New York article expresses skepticism even more sharply:
Pro Tempore Emeritus, Senate, to Steve Gunderson, President and CEO, Council on
Foundations (June 9, 2010), https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
letter%20to%20Council%20on%20Foundations.pdf.
197 See, e.g., supra notes 106, 115, 123, 130, 134.
198 Steven Rathgeb Smith, Foundations and Public Policy, in AMERICAN FOUNDATIONS: ROLES AND CONTRIBUTIONS 371, 374 (Helmut K. Anheier & David C. Hammack
eds. 2010). Form 990 is the annual return for charities; public charities file a regular Form
990 and private foundations file a Form 990-PF. About Form 990, Return of Organization
Exempt from Income Tax, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/forms-pubs/
about-form-990 [https://perma.cc/75VL-66YE]; About Form 990-PF, Return of Private
Foundation or Section 4947(a)(1) Nonexempt Charitable Trust Treated as a Private Foundation, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/forms-pubs/about-form-990-pf
[https://perma.cc/UF7Z-SMT6].
199 Publicly, at least, no member of Congress has taken up the “Charity Stimulus”
plan to increase the minimum payout requirement for foundations and impose such a
requirement on DAFs. See, e.g., infra text accompanying footnotes 207-09.
200 A private operating foundation is a private foundation that spends at least 85% of
the lesser of (i) its adjusted net income and (ii) its minimum investment return on actively
conducting its charitable operations. It also has to meet one of three additional tests,
known as the assets test, the endowment test, and the support test. Definition of Private
Operating Foundation, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/charities-nonprofits/private-foundations/definition-of-private-operating-foundation [https://perma.cc/
W8BV-HUSX]. In exchange for meeting these requirements, private operating foundations are not subject to the minimum distribution requirements, and thresholds for a
donor’s maximum tax-deductible contribution to a private operating foundation exceed
those for a donor’s contribution to a private foundation. Private Operating Foundations,
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/private-foundations/
private-operating-foundations [https://perma.cc/DJ4F-ZWT6].
201 Martha Schwendener, ‘Jean-Michel Basquiat’ at the Brant Shows His Bifurcated
Life, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2019), http://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/05/arts/design/basquiatbrant-foundation.html [https://perma.cc/J437-K2BT].
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Though New York gems like the Frick and the Morgan also
began as the amassed treasures of titans of industry and finance, [the] . . . museum, housed in a retrofitted former Con
Edison substation on an otherwise still-gritty block of East 6th
Street, reads as a symbol of our city’s ongoing gentrification, as
well as an example of how culture has become a tool of social
control for today’s robber barons, not an act of noblesse
oblige. Ultimately, this exhibition comes off as a rich man’s
bauble, which doesn’t make for a good first impression.202
This criticism harkens back to the suspicion directed toward private philanthropy in the pre-Act period and, specifically, legislators’ concerns
that tax revenue was being diverted to support institutions that ultimately provided minimal social benefit.203
The public response to the efforts to reconstruct Notre Dame after
the catastrophic fire of April 2019 evidences public skepticism about private philanthropy on a global level. Private philanthropists rushed to
help, pledging and donating funds directly to the reconstruction effort.204 Not all observers were pleased, however. Some questioned
whether rebuilding Notre Dame represented a worthy use of charitable
funds,205 while others objected to the manner in which philanthropists
helped, arguing “that for society to be most effective, philanthropists
need to work with government and the private sector, not alone or in
opposition to them.”206
The public response to foundations’ role in the COVID-19 pandemic represents yet another illustration of skepticism. Responding to
the concern that “donors can contribute to charitable intermediaries
[i.e., private foundations and DAFs] that then may sideline the funds for
years — or forever” and that “ordinary taxpayers need to see the bene202 Joseph R. Wolin, Jean-Michel Basquiat, TIME OUT N.Y. (Feb. 22, 2019), https://
www.timeout.com/newyork/art/jean-michel-basquiat-1 [https://perma.cc/2E2C-LZ9F].
203 See, e.g., Walsh Commission Report Vol. 1, supra note 29, at 81; COMM. ON WAYS
& MEANS H.R., REVENUE ACT OF 1950, H.R. REP. NO. 81-2319, at 43-44 (1950).
204 Sullivan, supra note 8.
205 Id.
206 Id. Interestingly, some commentators see foundations as overly entwined with
government. In the July 20, 2020 issue of The New Yorker, Jane Mayer details the ways in
which foundations created and funded by Robert Cameron, the owner of Montaire Corporation, one of the largest poultry purveyors in the United States, have helped Cameron
exert political influence. Jane Mayer, How Trump is Helping Tycoons Exploit the Pandemic, NEW YORKER (July 13, 2020), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/07/20/
how-trump-is-helping-tycoons-exploit-the-pandemic [https://perma.cc/FQ2T-E5WG]
(“[T]his decline in worker power, more than any other structural change in the economy,
accounts for nearly all the gains in the share of income made by America’s wealthiest one
per cent. An outgrowth of this trend is the accumulation of enormous wealth and political
influence by private foundations.”).
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fit of the funds they subsidized flowing to charities on the ground,” the
Institute for Policy Studies proposed doubling the annual payment requirement for private foundations to 10% and instituting a 10% annual
payment requirement for DAFs, with these reforms to continue for the
next three years.207 Pointedly, the Institute for Policy Studies noted,
“[F]or every $1 a billionaire gives to charity, the rest of us chip in as
much as 74 cents in lost tax revenue.”208 An Ipsos poll suggests that
72% of Americans would support this change.209
The reactions mirror the unease about concentration of wealth that
predominated in the Gilded Age and the concerns voiced in the Congressional testimony leading up to the Act’s passage that foundations
exercised undue control over civic life. Nicolas Berggruen, a “billionaire
philanthropist,” according to The New York Times, connected the backlash to the Notre Dame reconstruction efforts with both of these: “In
the age of anxiety,” he told The Times, “people will look to accuse lots
of different groups for all of the evil or some of the evil. Rich people for
sure fall into this. Philanthropists are an extension of that.”210 Phil
Buchanan, Chief Executive Officer of the Center for Effective Philanthropy, explicitly attributed criticism of philanthropists to “anger over
unequal distribution of wealth,” and defended private philanthropists by
contending, “I don’t believe most big philanthropists are motivated by a
desire to maintain the status quo via their giving or to protect themselves from higher taxation.”211 He noted the important social contributions of many private foundations: the Robert Wood Johnson
Foundation, for example, supported the “911 emergency system and the
field of nurse practitioners,” and the Libra Foundation, funded by a
branch of the Pritzker family, “supplied $350,000 in grants to organiza207 See Chuck Collins & Helen Flannery, The Case for an Emergency Charity Stimulus: An IPS Inequality Briefing Paper, INST. FOR POL’Y STUD. 5-6 (May 11, 2020), https://
inequality.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Brief-CharityStimulus-Revision-May12FINAL.pdf.
208 Id. at 13.
209 Americans’ Understanding and Opinions about Charitable Foundations and Donor-Advised Funds, INST. FOR POL’Y STUD. 6 (May 30, 2020), https://inequality.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/06/Summary-of-American-Opinions-re-Foundations_May-302020.pdf. In fact, there appears to be support for increased foundation payouts from
within the foundation sector as well. The current presidents of several foundations (including the Ford Foundation, the Kellogg Foundation, and the MacArthur Foundation)
have pledged to significantly increase their payouts in light of COVID-19. David Brancaccio & Rose Conlon, How the President of the Ford Foundation Would Reimagine the
Economy, MARKETPLACE (July 2, 2020), https://www.marketplace.org/2020/07/02/fordfoundation-darren-walker-charitable-organizations-philanthropy-economy-social-bonds/
[https://perma.cc/5HFS-KUP2].
210 Sullivan, supra note 8.
211 Id.
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tions addressing the needs of families being separated at the United
States-Mexico border.”212 Regardless of private foundations’ manifest
social contributions, however, the public evidently remains skeptical of
their value, stemming at least in part from concern over whether members of society should be as wealthy as many of the well-known founders
of private foundations are, and whether those causes that receive substantial financial assistance should be determined largely by private
citizens.
Public skepticism extends to the Act, not only because of broader
undercurrents of anxiety about wealth and private foundations’ control
over charitable priorities, but also because of the rules themselves.
Madoff points out, “There’s no reason that private foundations should
be defending meeting the 5% test by employing your kids and taking
trips to Hawaii,”213 a reference to the fact that salaries and travel expenses paid to family members are excluded from the self-dealing
prohibitions and count toward a foundation’s minimum distribution requirement. It’s “kind of crazy that they excluded that,” she notes; “It’s a
double whammy — both that it’s not self-dealing to employ your children and that it satisfies the 5% [minimum distribution] rule.”214 Sare
points to the fact that a foundation may satisfy its minimum distribution
requirement by making large distributions to donor-advised funds, or
DAFs, discussed in greater detail in the following section,215 as creating
a belief among some sector critics that charitable funds are being stockpiled through DAFs, because there is no guarantee that the recipient
DAF will, in turn, distribute those funds out to other public charities in a
timely manner.216 Ewenstein points to the example of a donor to a U.S.
charity that intends to re-grant the donated funds to a foreign charity,
noting the requirement that “you can have no oral or written agreement
as to what the ‘middleman’ is doing.”217 She wonders what the distinction between a conversation and an oral agreement really is.218 The
rules themselves, then, contain the seeds of their own undoing.
212

Id.
Madoff Interview, supra note 154.
214 Id.
215 See infra Part III.B.5.
216 Sare Interview, supra note 94.
217 Ewenstein Interview, supra note 156. A domestic foundation may make a grant to
a domestic public charity with the tacit understanding that the public charity will ultimately use the grant to support a foreign charity. That arrangement frees the foundation
from having to exercise expenditure responsibility while still effectively supporting a foreign charity, as long as no express agreement has been reached with the intermediary
domestic public charity.
218 Id.
213
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New rules enacted since the Act’s passage have had the further effect of undermining public confidence in the regulatory regime. Congress enacted the so-called Newman’s Own exception to the excess
business holdings rule in 2017.219 It permits a private foundation to own
100% of the voting stock in an operating business if (a) the foundation
did not purchase those interests, (b) all of the business’s net operating
income is distributed to the private foundation, and (c) the business is
operated independently from the private foundation.220 To Manny, this
exception represents a “whittling away” of the prohibition on excess
business holdings.221 Sare adds: “Some would say it allows one of the
things the 1969 Act was meant to avoid, in that it enables a private foundation to have a really concentrated position in a single company, which
often may not be desirable from a fiduciary standpoint.”222 If Congress
is essentially legislating against the aims of the 1969 Act, how can the
public be expected to remain convinced that the Act’s requirements are
necessary or wise?
And finally, highly publicized examples of foundations that continue to misbehave further undermine public confidence in the governance regime imposed by the Act. In one of the highest-profile examples
of such misbehavior, in 2018, Barbara Underwood, then the AttorneyGeneral of New York State, initiated an investigation into the Donald J.
Trump Foundation and ultimately accused the Trump Foundation of violating many of the Act’s rules.223 According to the complaint filed in
New York State Supreme Court in June 2018, the Trump Foundation
provided administrative assistance at a political fundraiser in Iowa,224
received funds from that fundraiser, and disbursed the funds in accordance with campaign staff directives,225 and separately used funds to
make donations to the Florida Attorney-General’s reelection campaign
in 2013,226 all in violation of the prohibition on foundation engagement
219 See Jeff Getty, Newman’s Own Tax Relief Available to Others, 20 J. ALLEGHENY
CNTY. BAR ASS’N, Nov. 23, 2018 at 10, 10. This rule is known as the Newman’s Own
exception because it effectively permitted the Newman’s Own Foundation to continue to
hold interests in the company that operates Newman’s Own beyond the five-year period
following Paul Newman’s death. The Newman’s Own Foundation would otherwise, in
accordance with the excess business holdings rule, have been required to divest itself of
80% of the interests in the company five years after having inherited those interests from
Paul Newman’s estate. See supra Part II.D.
220 I.R.C. § 4943(g).
221 Manny Interview, supra note 148.
222 Sare Interview, supra note 94.
223 See Verified Petition at 1, New York v. Trump, 88 N.Y.S.3d 830 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
June 14, 2018) (No. 451130/2018).
224 Id. at 11.
225 Id. at 13-14.
226 Id. at 21-22.
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in political activities. The complaint is littered with examples of violations of the self-dealing rules, too, including the use of foundation funds
to settle Donald Trump’s personal, resort-, and hotel-related lawsuits227
and the foundation’s purchase of a $10,000 portrait of Mr. Trump to be
displayed at a property he owned.228 Underwood characterized the
Trump Foundation as “functioning as little more than a checkbook to
serve Mr. Trump’s business and political interests,” and labeled its operations “a shocking pattern of illegality.”229 A judge ordered Mr. Trump
to pay $2 million in damages to nonprofit groups after he admitted fault
for these acts of mismanagement.230 But the misdeeds of the Trump
Foundation stretched back many years; if they were so “shocking,” why
had no one bothered to investigate formally before Mr. Trump became
President? The public cannot be expected to have confidence in a regulatory regime that is not enforced.
5. The Rise of Alternatives
Unsurprisingly, as a result of the Act’s undue complexity, lack of
dialogue with the IRS, bright-line rules penalizing conduct that may in
fact aid charitable causes, and the lack of public faith in the private
foundation regulatory regime, private philanthropists have increasingly
turned to alternatives. As those alternatives proliferate, it is worth asking why private foundations should continue to be subject to these complex rules if the rules can simply be avoided, with a price — the inability
to implement a philanthropic vision through piloting specific programs,
or to claim certain tax deductions — that philanthropists are increasingly willing to pay.
A common alternative to private foundations is a donor-advised
fund, commonly known as a DAF. A DAF is a giving vehicle held at a
public charity or a large financial institution, such as Fidelity or Schwab,
that itself counts as a public charity for tax purposes.231 A donor may
contribute funds to a DAF while retaining advisory powers over grant
amounts and recipients.232 This structure mirrors the ability of the governing board of a private foundation to determine grant recipients, but
does not require a donor to comply with the Act’s governance restric227

Id. at 24-25.
Id. at 30.
229 Shane Goldmacher, Trump Foundation Will Dissolve, Accused of ‘Shocking Pattern of Illegality,’ N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/18/nyregion/ny-ag-underwood-trump-foundation.html [https://perma.cc/X48C-JW3P].
230 Alan Feuer, Trump Ordered to Pay $2 Million to Charities for Misuse of Foundations, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/07/nyregion/trumpcharities-new-york.html?module=inline [https://perma.cc/2Z4P-LNNP].
231 Cullman & Madoff, supra note 14.
232 See id.
228
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tions or maintain any administrative infrastructure. “People keep looking for simplicity,” Fox noted, which, to him, explains the rise and
popularity of the DAF.233 “DAFs have changed everything,” Manny
adds. “They provide a way to get around a lot of the rules” and are “a
great equalizer” because “[y]ou don’t have to be Bill Gates to set up
your own fund” but can still accomplish many of the goals of a private
foundation, “unless,” she notes, “you want to hire your children.”234
Madoff concurs: “It’s a little bit like ‘other than that, Mrs. Lincoln,’”
because DAFs “have so dwarfed other charitable giving. Every year
they’re now five and six of the top ten charitable organizations in terms
of donations.”235 While, as Sare points out, DAFs predate the 1969
Act,236 and so their rise cannot be solely attributed to philanthropists’
desire to avoid the Act’s cumbersome restrictions, DAFs have certainly
come to the fore in recent years.
But the rise of DAFs may ultimately be problematic for the landscape of charitable giving. Despite the fact that the DAF structure may
reduce barriers to entry for philanthropists, DAFs have no minimum
distribution requirement. A donor will receive an immediate tax benefit
for funds contributed to a DAF without any assurance of near-term corresponding social benefit.237 As Madoff and philanthropist Lewis B.
Cullman write, contributions to DAFs, which “have been given the tax
benefits of charitable donations,” may “be held in a DAF for decades or
even centuries, all the while earning management fees for the financial
institutions managing the funds, and producing no social value.”238 Indeed, according to Cullman and Madoff, “nearly 22 percent of all DAF
sponsors reported no grants at all.”239 Furthermore, while many foundations have piloted important social programs that are targeted to meet
specific needs that the government cannot or will not address — the
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation’s sponsorship of the 911 emergency
233

Fox Interview, supra note 155.
Manny Interview, supra note 148.
235 Madoff Interview, supra note 154.
236 Sare Interview, supra note 94. Sare notes that the original DAFs were housed at
community foundations, and that it has only been in more recent decades that DAFs
associated with large investment firms have come into existence. Id.
237 See Cullman & Madoff, supra note 14.
238 Id. (“Because of a 1991 IRS ruling obtained by Fidelity (and similar rulings obtained by other commercially sponsored DAFs), clients get the same tax benefits when
they transfer property to their donor-advised funds that they would get by making outright contributions to a museum, soup kitchen, university, or any other federally recognized charity. But no deadline is imposed for the eventual distribution of these funds to
an operating charity.”).
239 Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 207-09 (discussing the Institute for
Policy Studies’s proposal to impose a minimum payout requirement for DAFs).
234
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dial system,240 the Sarah Scaife Foundation’s polio-related grants,241 and
the Carnegie Corporation’s support of public libraries across the country,242 among the many examples identified in this article — those programs are unlikely to be fostered via contributions to a DAF for several
reasons. First, distributions from DAFs are typically made anonymously,243 which makes it unlikely that a DAF’s donor-advisor would be
a visionary philanthropist eager to endow and support an ongoing program, either because the donor-advisor is not interested in so being or
because the donor-advisor is not sufficiently interested to merit the
start-up costs and ongoing compliance requirements of a private foundation. Second, the structure of the DAF only permits the donor-advisor
to advise on the amounts and recipients of distributions;244 it does not
permit a donor-advisor to establish and oversee a particular program,
which discourages the contribution of funds to smaller charities over
which the donor-advisor could have more significant influence and, potentially, a higher degree of control. Correspondingly, DAF distributions are more likely to be contributed to large existing charities that are
already well-funded. And third, many DAFs are governed by financial
advisory organizations, which, to earn management fees, often encourage donor-advisors to “hoard, rather than distribute, their DAF
funds.”245
Moreover, the DAF structure has served to further erode public
confidence in the regulatory regime governing private philanthropy,
both by concocting a legal fiction that a DAF’s sponsoring organization
would ever deny a donor-advisor’s request and by raising the question
of why private foundations need to be subject to the Act’s myriad complexities while a different type of organization that accomplishes a similar goal need not be. Hall reflects, “I doubt there are many examples of
sponsoring organizations turning down a grant request from a DAF ad240

See supra text accompanying note 212.
See Frumkin, supra note 5, at 266-67.
242 See Viadero, supra note 6.
243 Helaine Olen, Is the New Way to Give a Better Way to Give?, ATLANTIC (Dec. 13,
2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/12/donor-advised-funds-deduction-charity/548324/ [https://perma.cc/9MES-VLAQ] (“When money arrives from a donor-advised fund, a charity often doesn’t know who actually made the donation.”).
244 See I.R.C. § 4966(2)(A)(iii).
245 See Cullman & Madoff, supra note 14. Notably, however, this trend may not continue for the 2020 calendar year in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. See, e.g., Communities in Crisis: How Donors are Responding to COVID-19, FIDELITY CHARITABLE (2020),
https://www.fidelitycharitable.org/content/dam/fc-public/docs/insights/communities-in-crisis-how-donors-are-responding-to-covid-19.pdf. In the first four months of 2020, DAFs
distributed $3.4 billion, an increase of 28% from the same period in 2019. Id.
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visor to an entity listed in Publication 78.246 It does make you wonder
why we cannot accommodate in our tax system donor-directed funds
and avoid what looks a lot like a control-charade.”247 But the requirements of this “charade” are far easier to comply with than the private
foundation governance rules of the 1969 Act. Other than for the philanthropists who are most committed to implementing a vision for charitable work by creating and overseeing new programs, the ease of
administration of a DAF will, for most, outweigh the potential benefits
of the private foundation structure. This has the undesirable consequence of deterring philanthropists who might otherwise be actively engaged in beneficial charitable programs through their private
foundations. The tax deduction is the same, so, for those philanthropists
on the fence, is it really worth bothering with a private foundation?
Section 501(c)(4) organizations are another increasingly popular alternative. A 501(c)(4) organization is a so-called social welfare organization, which is required to promote the common good and general
welfare of those in a particular community. A donor may not receive an
income tax deduction for donations to a 501(c)(4) organization, but donations do qualify for a gift tax deduction, and permit a donor to defer
or eliminate capital gains on donated assets. As David Miller points out,
“the crucial assumption underlying the different treatment between section 501(c)(3) charitable organizations and section 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations is that the charitable deduction is more valuable to
taxpayers than the capital gains exclusion. For most taxpayers, this assumption is correct. For super-wealthy people, this assumption is
not.”248 Dale agrees, noting that 501(c)(4) organizations are “growing
like crazy” because “for most really wealthy taxpayers, the income tax
deduction is close to valueless. The gift tax deduction really matters.”249
Sare concurs, noting, “It never really seems to have occurred to people
in 1969 that there would be a significant population of people who have
significant wealth who would be willing to forego the income tax charitable deduction,” but, in fact, that is exactly the case now, which explains why “[t]he 501(c)(4) has become the vehicle of choice for a lot of

246 Hall Interview, supra note 151. Publication 78 is the colloquial name for the IRS’s
so-called Cumulative List, which identifies organizations that have been designated by
the IRS as eligible to receive tax-deductible contributions from donors. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 25.7.6(1) (Jan. 1, 2018), https://www.irs.gov/
irm/part25/irm_25-007-006 [https://perma.cc/8P9R-FQ95].
247 Hall Interview, supra note 151.
248 David S. Miller, Social Welfare Organizations as Grantmakers, 21 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 413, 435 (2018).
249 Dale Interview, supra note 68.
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philanthropy.”250 The tax benefits of the 501(c)(4) organization, then,
are a primary driver of its popularity.
The assets of a 501(c)(4) organization may inure in part to the benefit of its donor251 — another reason for the 501(c)(4) organization’s
popularity. Miller explains that a 501(c)(4) organization “can benefit
classes or a community that would not be charitable for purposes of
section 501(c)(3) and can provide private benefits so long as providing
private benefits is not the organization’s primary activity.”252 He gives
the example of a 501(c)(4) organization created with the purpose of
beautifying a single city block. The organization would assuredly increase the property values of those who live on the block and so could
not qualify as a public charity or private foundation because its private
benefits would be substantial, but that mission would be permissible for
a 501(c)(4) organization. Indeed, a 501(c)(4) organization’s assets “need
not be used exclusively for charitable purposes; instead, the assets may
be used for more relaxed social welfare purposes . . . .”253 A 501(c)(4)
organization, then, can shelter capital gains and offer some private
benefit.
Finally, the 501(c)(4) organization is administratively far less cumbersome than a private foundation. A 501(c)(4) organization is easy to
set up: a donor need only file a Form 8976 with the IRS within 60 days
of the organization’s establishment. It is not subject to the minimum
distribution requirement, may engage in political activities, and need not
comply with the self-dealing rules; instead, it is only required to satisfy
the “more relaxed ‘excess benefit transaction’ rules.”254 It need not exercise expenditure responsibility for grants made to individuals or foreign charities, and may hold interests in companies without regard to
the excess business holdings rules. It is no wonder, then, that 501(c)(4)
organizations have become popular.
But the increased use of 501(c)(4) organizations also has potentially
detrimental social consequences. Donors receive capital gains tax exemptions for transferred assets without any assurance to the public of
the type of wide-ranging social benefit that, ideally, private foundations
(and public charities) would engender because 501(c)(4) organizations
are not subject to the same limitations on charitable purposes. And if a
significant reason why donors are flocking to 501(c)(4) organizations is,
as commentators indicate, the ability to distribute funds for reasons
other than religious, charitable, scientific, public safety-related, literary,
250
251
252
253
254

Sare Interview, supra note 94.
See I.R.C. § 501(c)(4)(B).
Miller, supra note 248, at 418.
Id. at 416.
Id. at 416-17; see supra note 187.
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or educational purposes, and to do so while sheltering assets from capital gains tax — two motivations unlikely to speak to truly visionary philanthropists — it is far less likely that a 501(c)(4) organization would be
responsible for the type of valuable programs that private foundations
have fostered. But were private foundations a more appealing option,
those who might otherwise create 501(c)(4) organizations while being
inclined toward more traditional philanthropic endeavors could still be
encouraged to opt for private foundations instead: after all, there are
certainly other mechanisms for reducing one’s capital gains taxes that do
not involve philanthropy, so those who establish 501(c)(4) organizations
are likely to have at least some significant interest in charitable endeavors. Those would-be private foundations are missed opportunities for
new socially-beneficial programs.
The DAF and the 501(c)(4) organization are both attractive options
for private philanthropists seeking alternatives to private foundations.
Their popularity is understandable. DAFs and 501(c)(4) organizations
are both easy to establish. DAFs require donors to expend virtually
nothing on their ongoing administration, and neither DAFs nor
501(c)(4) organizations are subject to the byzantine requirements of the
private foundation regulatory regime. Both present significant tax advantages to donors, and a 501(c)(4) organization’s assets may even benefit, in part, the donor himself or herself. But, for the reasons discussed
above, the structures of both of these alternatives make it far less likely
that they will achieve the societal accomplishments of foundations past.
Were private foundations a less cumbersome option, it is likely that at
least some philanthropists who currently use DAFs or 501(c)(4) organizations as giving vehicles might instead opt for private foundations, with
the appurtenant prospect of greater social benefit.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Private foundations, as we have seen, have pioneered innovations
and created social programs that have been manifestly beneficial. They
are uniquely suited to nimbly target particular societal needs that are
unmet by the government. For those reasons, it is this author’s view that
we ought to find ways to restore private foundations to their place of
primacy, and to see the rise of alternatives as a warning bell that our
window of opportunity may be closing.
A number of commentators began our interviews by sharing the
view that we need a clean slate for foundation governance — that the
rules are hopelessly complicated and penalize behavior that is not only
not harmful but may in fact be beneficial for philanthropy. Commenta-
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tors particularly focused on the self-dealing rules and, to a lesser extent,
the excess business holdings rules.255
We can agree that donors should not abuse their relationships with
private foundations for personal gain. The question is how to craft a
regulatory regime that carries out that philosophy without unduly burdening foundations or prohibiting behavior that should be permitted.
The arm’s-length tests of the pre-1969 tax laws that applied in the selfdealing and excess business holdings contexts did prove unworkable, as
we have seen; however, that unworkability was, at least in significant
part, due to the insufficient strength, capacity, and resources of the
IRS’s audit function, and also to the IRS’s general lack of sophistication
at the time about the nature and activities of private foundations.256 In
the intervening half century since the Act’s passage, the IRS has certainly become expert in these issues and acutely aware of the practices
and activities of private foundations.
What has not changed, however, is that the IRS does not have the
resources to engage in sufficient audits or meaningful dialogue with private foundations.257 A more robust and well-resourced audit function
would allow us to move away from the bright-line rules that have
proven to be overbroad and exceedingly complex. In the self-dealing
context, potential violations of foundation managers’ fiduciary duties
and fidelity to charitable endeavors should be evaluated on a case-bycase basis. As Hopkins noted, “The inability of the IRS to abate the selfdealing tax has always struck me as being a little overdone and somewhat unfair. Because, of course, intent in the self-dealing context is totally irrelevant” for the purposes of section 4941,258 though arguably it
should be a factor in imposition of penalties given the complexity of the
section’s requirements.
In the excess business holdings context, a three-tiered system
should be implemented. The bottom tier would represent business holdings that are per se acceptable, with a higher threshold than the 20 (or
35) percent limitations currently in place.259 The top tier would re255 See supra Parts II.B (discussing the self-dealing rules) and II.D (discussing the
excess business holdings rules).
256 Owens notes that “the first Form 990 was created in 1941, and before that there
was just no flow of information at all about tax-exempt organizations,” and it wasn’t until
the 1950s that “the IRS began a program of oversight” and created a division in the
national office of the IRS to oversee these organizations. Owens Interview, supra note
67.
257 Paul Kiel & Jesse Eisinger, How the IRS Was Gutted, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 11,
2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/how-the-irs-was-gutted [https://
perma.cc/Q4YY-2FSN].
258 Hopkins Interview, supra note 140.
259 See supra Part II.D (discussing the excess business holdings rules).
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present business holdings that are per se unacceptable. And the middle
tier, between the percentage limitations of the bottom and top tiers,
would represent business holdings at intermediate levels, the propriety
of which would be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. The Treasury Department should make a recommendation to Congress as to the percentages applicable to each category by evaluating the operations of
foundations that report either having to divest themselves of excess business holdings (and considering whether such divestments represented
beneficial outcomes for the foundations at issue and charitable causes
more broadly) or holding concentrations of business interests near the
upper limit of the currently-permissible thresholds (and considering
whether those foundations’ charitable goals were at all jeopardized by
their business holdings).
These proposals would require that foundations report all potential
self-dealing transactions and any business holdings with concentrations
in the percentage range of the middle tier so that the IRS could properly
evaluate them. This reporting regime has analogues in other areas of the
law. For instance, the section 16 reporting requirements under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 mandate that insiders of a company report transactions in which they engage that involve the company’s
securities by filing a Form 4 with the Securities and Exchange Commission.260 This procedure has worked properly in the securities law context; there is no reason to think that it would not in the private
foundations context.
The United Kingdom presents a useful example of how the IRS
might enforce a fact-specific regime and, in so doing, engage in dialogue
with foundations rather than simply act as a punitive force. As Clarissa
Lyons, Senior Associate at Bates Wells Braithwaite LLP in London with
a practice focused on charity and charity legacy planning, explained,
when the Charity Commission, which regulates U.K. charities, discovers
or is tipped off to breaches of trust, it “will generally engage the charity
in the first instance” rather than simply levying a penalty from the outset.261 “The powers that they have,” Lyons continued, include “a sort of
warning power, where they will warn a charity’s trustees that their activities are not acceptable and they may need to take certain action.”262
That warning is usually made public.263 The Charity Commission also
has “the power to, in more extreme cases, remove certain trustees who
260 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, SEC1475 (05-19), FORM 4: GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
1, 2 (2019), https://www.sec.gov/files/form4data%2C0.pdf.
261 Interview with Clarissa Lyons, Senior Assoc., Bates Wells Braithwaite LLP (June
17, 2019).
262 Id.
263 Id.
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have been shown to be acting improperly,” and “put interim managers
in place of those trustees.”264
How does the Charity Commission evaluate whether a particular
act is worthy of sanction? “You would look to see if the principles of
trust law have been managed properly,” Lyons explains. In the case of a
transaction that could potentially raise self-dealing issues, the Charity
Commission evaluates the process by which the transaction was consummated, looking to see if any resulting benefit was permitted by statute or
by the charity’s governing documents and that “[t]he relevant person
didn’t take part in the decision-making process and the other people
involved decided it was in the best interest of the charity.”265 But, as
Lyons notes, there are “no bright-line rules, so charity trustees must adhere to their fiduciary duties.”266 Recently, the Charity Commission has
had difficulty enforcing these standards due in significant part to the fact
that the Charity Commission “has seen big budget cuts in recent years
which have affected its staffing levels.”267
To properly enforce a fact-specific regulatory regime, then, the audit and engagement function must be well-funded. Fortunately, the 1969
Act’s legislative history provides the solution: use the “audit fee” —
which is how legislators understood the tax on net investment income —
for its intended purpose.268 Absent this use of the net investment income tax, it is difficult to justify the tax at all. The excise taxes that arise
for violations of the self-dealing and excess business holdings rules, for
instance, are intended to shape behavior by penalizing foundations for
engaging in activities that Congress has decided are impermissible. But
why should private foundations — tax-exempt entities — be taxed on
their net investment income, the accumulation of which is not only permissible but desirable? Manny notes that “Oversight is good for the sector. But the money [from the net investment income tax] . . . just goes
right into the federal coffers and they use it for whatever they want to

264

Id.
Id.
266 Id.
267 Id. One recent development suggests rumblings of a revitalization of the Charity
Commission. In July 2020, the U.K. announced that it would be funding one of the Commission’s programs designed to reallocate money from dormant trusts into charities, a
program that the Commission notes has transferred £32 million since 2018. See Press
Release, Charities Receive over £32 Million from Dormant Trusts, CHARITY COMM’N
(July 3, 2020), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/charities-receive-over-32-millionfrom-dormant-trusts [https://perma.cc/22KV-S8L2].
268 S. REP. NO. 95-790, at 1 (1978).
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use it for. It’s not serving its original intended purpose.”269 For that reason, Fox calls this tax “just crazy.”270
According to IRS data, $581 million was collected in net investment
income tax in 2016.271 In fiscal year 2016, the IRS appropriated approximately $4.9 billion to enforcement across all areas, of which private
foundation governance is a very small part.272 If even a fraction of the
funds generated by the net investment income tax were actually used as
intended for audit purposes, we would be able to fund a robust enforcement and oversight body that could engage in dialogue with the regulated entities.
A cascade of benefits would flow from allocating these funds as
Congress intended, making it the single most important fix that Congress can implement. Congress could then remove the bright-line rules
in the self-dealing context and limit their applicability in the excess business holdings context, and permit foundations to engage in certain behavior that is now penalized but would ultimately be beneficial to
charitable causes. Removing those bright-line rules could actually increase foundations’ assets under management, both by eliminating the
inadvertent tripping-up that commentators cited as a consequence of the
rules’ complexity and that triggers excise taxes, and by permitting foundations to engage in a broader range of financially-beneficial transactions. Foundation managers could consult the IRS when considering
engaging in certain transactions to get a sense of whether the transactions would be penalized. And the IRS could effectively promote good
grant-making by serving as a real resource for private foundations, by
issuing clarifying memoranda and rulings in the area, and by having the
funding and staff to study the relative efficacy of various philanthropic
dispositions, which likely would serve to buttress public faith in these
organizations.
This funding could also allow the IRS to engage in projects that
would lessen reporting burdens on foundations and make reported information more useful to foundations and the public. Ewenstein suggests, for instance, that the IRS compile a searchable database of Form
1023 applications273 so that those philanthropists seeking to create pri269

Manny Interview, supra note 148.
Fox Interview, supra note 155.
271 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TABLE 1, supra note 4.
272 Program Summary by Appropriations Account and Budget Activity, INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV. (2017), https://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/IRS%20FY%202017%20
BIB.pdf.
273 These are applications for charitable exemptions that private foundations file on
inception. See About Form 1023, Application for Recognition of Exemption Under Section
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/
forms-pubs/about-form-1023 [https://perma.cc/Y833-JFZD].
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vate foundations could have a sense of what the IRS has already approved when modeling their own foundations.274 The IRS could
streamline the Form 990-PF275 to reduce administrative costs in its preparation and increase available useful knowledge on private foundations.
Owens calls the 990-PF an “unwieldy document” and “a shield from
disclosure. Some of the large private foundations’ 990-PFs are a foot
high of paper. It’s difficult to find information.”276 Making the Form
990-PF more easily searchable could help mitigate that issue, as could
the IRS’s evaluating which information in the 990-PF the IRS, other
foundation managers, and the public really need. The IRS appears to
take a kitchen-sink approach to the 990-PF, without seeming to engage
in any critical assessment of the value of new questions and disclosure
requirements that it adds. The revenue from the net investment income
tax could give the IRS the funding it needs to study and revise this annual report so that it can be useful to all parties.
To further incentivize good grant-making and remove unnecessary
barriers to participation in private philanthropy, changes should be
made to the minimum distribution requirement277 and the expenditure
responsibility rules.278 With respect to the minimum distribution requirement, it is sound policy to require private foundations to pay out
certain amounts for charitable purposes. After all, they are receiving tax
exemptions — and donors are receiving income tax deductions — on
the assumption that these entities will further charitable causes. Madoff
proposes a tweak that would incentivize foundations to distribute more
assets to charity: she suggests that foundations pay the 2% net investment income tax if they distribute up to 6% of their assets, a 1% tax if
they distribute between 6% and 8% of their assets, and no net investment income tax if they distribute more than 8% of their assets.279 That
would, of course, reduce the “audit fee” pool of funds, so further study
would be required to determine the likely outcome of pairing these new
rules (perhaps at varying thresholds) with the required funding needs of
the IRS’s audit function. In addition, from a public confidence perspective, it may be desirable to remove foundations’ ability to count certain
expenses, like salaries and reimbursements, toward the minimum payout requirement.
Congress should also ease the burdens of the expenditure responsibility requirements, at least for foreign grantees. Given the obvious po274
275
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tential for abuse, it is logical to retain the expenditure responsibility
requirements in the context of grants to individuals (though, as Manny
points out, there are “so many ways around the rules about scholarships”).280 With respect to foreign grantees, however, Ewenstein suggests a workable solution: the IRS could provide guidance that, with
regard to foreign non-profit organizations that have particular known
charitable designations in their home countries, those charities should
be designated as U.S.-equivalent public charities or private foundations
(which the IRS already does with respect to certain Canadian tax-exempt organizations under an existing tax treaty with Canada)281 so that
grants to such organizations would be subject to the same rules that
would apply with respect to grants to domestic organizations.282 Given
that domestic societal needs often blur with international ones — the
current COVID-19 pandemic and the Ebola outbreak of 2014 are only
two such recent examples — it makes sense to permit foundations to
expand their global reach.
V. CONCLUSION
Based solely on IRS data, private foundations appear to be thriving. But a closer look reveals that foundation alternatives — in particular, DAFs and section 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations — are
rising to prominence in part because of widespread discontent with the
private foundation regulatory regime enacted as part of the 1969 Tax
Reform Act. And structural attributes of these foundation alternatives
threaten to reduce the efficacy of private philanthropy, with potentially
alarming consequences. Accordingly, while well-intentioned, the restrictions enacted as part of the 1969 Act have ultimately contributed to the
erosion of public confidence in private foundations and to the dismantling of the very system of private philanthropy that Congress — rightly
— sought to shore up in its legislation.
Fortunately, fixes are available. The revenue from the net investment income tax can be applied to the IRS’s audit and enforcement
program, which would allow Congress to replace the overly broad
bright-line rules incorporated into the Act with fact-specific tests and
facilitate good grant-making by promoting dialogue between the IRS
and foundation managers. Greater funding could reduce the burdensome requirements of the current Form 990-PF and make disclosed information more usable for regulators and practitioners alike. Tweaks to
the minimum distribution requirements and expenditure responsibility
280
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rules could buttress public confidence in the regulatory regime and promote less conventional — and perhaps more impactful — grant-making.
Together, these changes would make private foundations a more appealing choice for philanthropists and improve the landscape of charitable
giving.
While the American public and Congress have been, paradoxically,
supportive and suspicious of private philanthropy since the country’s inception, the social benefit of many private foundations’ programs and
grants is manifest. Congress has the opportunity to retool the private
foundation regulatory regime to ensure that private foundations maintain their place of primacy in private philanthropy and continue to deliver these socially-beneficial results. But with alternatives proliferating
rapidly, its window of opportunity may be closing. It is time for Congress to step in again so that the private foundation — and the important charitable benefits it can provide — does not become an artifact of
the past.

